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THE ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL REVIEWAND FOR THE ORIGINALIST APPROACH TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW (THE BEN J. ALTHEIMER LECTURE)*
Michael J. Perry**
Part One: The Argument for Judicial Review
I address two fundamental questions in the book from which this
lecture is drawn:' first, the question of the approach to constitutional
interpretation the Supreme Court should follow, and, second, the question of the nature of the role the Court should play-how large or active, or how small or passive, a role-in bringing the interpreted Constitution to bear in resolving constitutional conflicts. Neither question
would arise but for the practice of judicial review, which involves, centrally, the Court interpreting the Constitution in the course of resolving
constitutional conflicts. In Part One of this lecture, I inquire into the
legitimacy of judicial review. I do so not because the legitimacy of the
*
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practice is at issue in the United States today: Judicial review seems to
enjoy virtually consensual support in contemporary American society.'
I do so because it is useful to explain why a practice that yields persistent controversy about constitutional interpretation and proper judicial
role not merely enjoys our support, but merits it. More importantly, the
argument for judicial review, as I explain in Part Two of this lecture, is
an essential part of the argument for the approach to constitutional
interpretation that should inform the practice of judicial review.
The "judicial review" whose legitimacy is under discussion here is
the judicial practice of inquiring if a governmental act, or a failure to
act, violates the Constitution of the United States.' A governmental act
whose constitutionality is in question may be, at the one extreme, a
statute, or it may be, at the other extreme, a single action by a person
in her capacity as an official or employee of the government, or it may
be something in between. I am not concerned here with the judicial
practice of inquiring if a governmental act (or a failure to act) violates
a state constitution, although much of what I say in this lecture about
judicial review for federal constitutionality, including what I say about
the legitimacy of the practice, is applicable to the distinct but analogous practice of judicial review for state constitutionality. I am principally concerned here with judicial review (for federal constitutionality)
by the Supreme Court of the United States, although much of what I
say about judicial review, including what I say about the legitimacy of
the practice, is applicable both to judicial review by a federal court
other than the Supreme Court and to judicial review by a state court.
The legitimacy under discussion here is not the constitutional legitimacy-the constitutionality-of judicial review, but legitimacy in a
different sense: Is judicial review a good practice for us Americans, one
we should support, or is it, instead, a practice we would be better off
without, one we should oppose? Even if the Constitution establishes the
practice of judicial review, we can inquire if we should applaud that
state of affairs or, instead, condemn it and try to do something about it.
(In Appendix A to this lecture, I comment on the historical question
2. See infra note 115.
3. See ROBERT L. CLINTON, Marbury v. Madison AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1989): "'Judicial review,' as a term used to describe the constitutional power of a court to overturn statutes,
regulations, and other governmental activities, apparently was an invention of law writers in the
early twentieth century. Edward S. Corwin may have been the first to coin the phrase, in the title
of an article in the 1910 Michigan Law Review." Clinton's reference is to Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REV. 102 (1910).
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whether the Constitution establishes the practice of judicial review.)
I
The problem of the legitimacy of judicial review is rooted in what
Alexander Bickel famously called "the counter-majoritarian difficulty:"
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system. There are various ways of sliding
over this ineluctable reality. Marshall did so when he spoke of enforcing, in behalf of "the people," the limits that they have ordained for
the institutions of a limited government. And it has been done ever
since in much the same fashion by all too many commentators. Marshall himself followed Hamilton, who in the 78th Federalist denied
that judicial review implied a superiority of the judicial over the legislative power-denied, in other words, that judicial review constituted
control by an unrepresentative minority of an elected majority. "It
only supposes," Hamilton went on, "that the power of the people is
superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in
its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather
than the former." But the word "people" so used is an abstraction.
Not necessarily a meaningless or a pernicious one by any means; always charged with emotion, but nonrepresentational-an abstraction
obscuring the reality that when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but
against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens. .

.

.[I]t is the reason the charge can be made that judicial re-

view is undemocratic.'
Although, as Bickel acknowledged at length, "no democracy operates
by taking continuous nose counts on the broad range of daily governmental activities" 5 and "the process of reflecting the will of a popular
majority in the legislature is deflected ...by all sorts of institutional

habits and characteristics, which perhaps tend most often in favor of
inertia, ' 6 it is nonetheless true, as Bickel insisted, that
"nothing in the . ..complexities and perplexities of the [American
democratic] system . . .can alter the essential reality that judicial
4. ALEXANDER M.
5. Id. at 17.
6. Id. at 18-19.

BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH

16-17 (1962).
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review is a deviant institution in the American democracy ...
[Njothing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned
in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it
be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions,
born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the
system. Judicial review works counter to this characteristic." 7
Given the counter-majoritarian difficulty, the question arises
whether judicial review is a practice we Americans should support.
Does judicial review, which enjoys our support, merit our support?
II
Political communities can establish rights and liberties-that is,
they can establish them as "law," they can accord them the status of
"law"-by means of statutory law, and they often do. But political
communities can also establish rights and liberties by means of constitutional law, and they sometimes do. Consider what it means for a
democratic political community that wants to accord a right (or a liberty) the status of law to opt for the constitutional strategy rather than
for-or merely for-the statutory strategy. Consider, that is, what it
means, as a practical matter, for a democratic political community to
name and then to seek to protect a right by means of constitutional law
rather than (merely) by means of statutory law. (The constitutional
strategy can be used to establish the various institutions of government,
and to allocate power among them, as well as to establish limits, in the
form of rights and liberties, on governmental power. But because my
principal concern in the book from which this lecture is drawn is with
those parts of the Constitution, like the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, that establish rights and liberties, I want to comment on the constitutional strategy mainly as a strategy for establishing rights and liberties.) Whereas statutory law typically may be
revised or repealed by legislative majorities, national constitutions typically provide that constitutional provisions may be amended only by
legislative and/or popular supermajorities. According to Article V of
the Constitution of the United States, for example, "The Congress,
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
7.

Id. at 17-18, 19.
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Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed by the Congress . . . ." Chapter IX of the Constitution of
Japan, to cite one more example, provides that "[a]mendments to this
Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of
,8
two-thirds or more of all the members of each House ....
Indeed, constitutions can and sometimes do provide that a particular provision or provisions may not be amended at all. Article V of the
Constitution of the United States provides that "no state, without its
Consent shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." The
Constitution of Japan arguably immunizes some constitutional provisions to amendment in providing, in Article 11, that "[t]he people shall
not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights.
These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights." 9
For a democratic political community to opt for the constitutional
strategy for establishing a right, then-for it to name and then to seek
to protect a right by means of constitutional law rather than (merely)
by means of statutory law-is for the community to try to make it
especially difficult, both for the present members of the community at a
later time and, above all, for the future members at a much later time,
to disestablish the right. (And, if and to the extent the community's
constitution is taken seriously in the future, opting for the constitutional strategy is for the community not merely to try, but to succeed in
making it especially difficult, in the future, to disestablish the right.)
Opting for the constitutional strategy is for the community to decree, in
effect, that the right may be disestablished, if at all, not by a legislative
majority acting through the ordinary politics of legislative revision, but
only by a legislative and/or a popular supermajority acting through the
8. Chapter IX continues: "and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification,
which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such elections as the Diet shall specify."
9. Similarly, Article 98 provides: "The fundamental human rights by this Constitution
guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have
survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations
in trust, to be held for all time inviolate." It has been suggested that the Constitution of Germany,
because it "declares that certain fundamental principles are immune to constitutional amendment," exemplifies "absolute entrenchment." Anupam Chander, Soveriegnty, Referenda, and the
Entrenchment of a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE L.J. 457, 462 & n.30 (1991).
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extraordinary politics of constitutional amendment. (The "may," of
course, is the may of legality, not of politics or morality.)' 0
We might be tempted to think that the constitutional strategy for
establishing a right differs from the statutory strategy in another basic
respect, in that constitutions, unlike statutes, typically declare themselves to be "the supreme law" 1 -and that therefore for a democratic
political community to opt for the constitutional strategy is for it to
decree that the right is lexically prior to statutory and other nonconstitutional law, in particular to subsequently enacted law. But perhaps a
legislature may decree in a statute establishing a right that the right is
lexically prior to subsequently enacted statutory law in this sense and
to this extent:
A court is not to give effect to any future statute enacted by this legislature to the extent the statute, in the court's judgment, violates the
right established by this statute, unless such future statute explicitly
judgment
states that a court is to give it effect even if in the court's
12
the statute violates the right established by this statute.
Even if a legislature may, in one session, enact such a decree, however,
13
the legislature presumably may, in a later session, repeal the decree.
What is most distinctive about the constitutional strategy, then, is less
the supremacy of constitutional law than the extreme difficulty of
amending a constitution.
Why, in any event, might a political community want to accord
lexical priority to a right? The basic reason, presumably, is that the
community deems the right to be especially important. But assuming
that a democratic political community may accord lexical priority to a
right it deems especially important by means of the kind of statutory
strategy suggested in the preceding paragraph, why might the commu10. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Cf. Chander, supra note 9, at 462: "An
absolutely entrenched [constitutional provision] is . . . (as are all other parts of an existing legal
regime) vulnerable to revolution."
11. Article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides that "[tihis ConstituArticle 98 of the Constitution of Japan
tion . . . shall be the supreme law of the land .
provides: "This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall
have legal force or validity."
12. See Chander, supra note 9, at 463: "One common type of manner and form entrenchment requires that all contrary legislation contain an explicit declaration of its intent to override
the entrenched rule."
13. See generally Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379.
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nity opt for the constitutional strategy? Why, that is, might at least
some members of the community want to make it so difficult to disestablish a right or a liberty? A basic reason, presumably, is that they
are skeptical about the capacity of the ordinary, majoritarian politics of
the community adequately to protect the right, especially during politically stressful times when the right may be most severely challenged.
The reasons for their skepticism can be various: They may fear that at
some points in the future, perhaps even at many points, they who are so
enthusiastic about the right will no longer dominate the ordinary politics of the community, or dominate it to the extent they presently do;
they may even fear that many of those who will dominate the ordinary
politics of the community, at some points in the future, will be hostile
to the right. They may also fear that even at those points when they
(the enthusiasts of the right) continue to dominate ordinary politics,
they will, for one reason or another, fail adequately to protect the right,
or they may fear that their political representatives, over whom they
exert imperfect control, will fail adequately to protect it. Whatever the
precise reason or constellation of reasons for their skepticism,1 4 the constitutional strategy for establishing a right, as distinct from the statutory strategy, presupposes a distrust, a lack of faith, in the (present or
future) ordinary politics of the community.
Not that there are not other basic reasons for pursuing the constitutional strategy, which, as I said, can be used to allocate governmental
power as well as to establish limits on that power. For example, a political community may need to establish, or to re-establish, its basic institutions, institutional arrangements, and practices, so that an ordinary
politics might then begin, or begin again, to operate. Or a community
may want to remove certain issues from the agenda of ordinary politics,
based less on a fear that its ordinary politics cannot be trusted to resolve the issues than on a fear that a contest about how they should be
resolved might incapacitate or even destroy the ordinary politics of the
community. 15 Even when a political community does not need to establish any basic institutions, institutional arrangements, or practices,
however, and even when the community has little if any reason to fear
that a contest about how a certain issue should be resolved might inca14. For a thoughtful discussion of such reasons, see David Chang, A Critique of Judicial
Supremacy, 36 VILL. L. REV. 281, 290-302 (1991).
15. For a helpful "outline of some of the reasons for entrenching institutional arrangements
and substantive rights," see Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHi. L.
REV. 633, 636-43 (1991).
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pacitate, much less destroy, its ordinary politics, the community may
be skeptical about the capacity of ordinary politics, especially during
stressful times, adequately to protect a right the community deems particularly important.
In a federal political community, like the United States, such
skepticism may be focused, at a given time, less on the capacity of the
(present or future) ordinary politics of the states to protect a right than
on the capacity of the ordinary politics of the national government. Or,
at a given time, it may be focused less on the capacity of the ordinary
politics of the national government than on the capacity of the ordinary
politics of the states, or of some of them. Whatever the particular case,
such skepticism seems a, if not the, fundamental reason why the constitutional strategy exemplified by provisions like the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment has been pursued in the United States.
Given such distrust, the constitutional strategy will include-and,
to be effective, must include-an enforcement mechanism."6 Judicial
review is the principal such mechanism. Article VI of the Constitution
of the United States, for example, provides not merely that "[t]his
Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land," but also that
"the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Article
81 of the Constitution of Japan provides that "[t]he Supreme Court is
the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of
any law, order, regulation or official act." Is it the case, then, that the
constitutional strategy for establishing a right, which presupposes a distrust of ordinary politics, presupposes a trust in constitutional adjudication; does it presuppose that constitutional adjudication will be adequate to protect the right, even during those politically stressful times
when the right may be most severely challenged? Not necessarily.
Those who opt for the constitutional strategy for establishing a right
may simply be, for whatever reason or reasons, less skeptical about the
capacity, in general, of constitutional adjudication adequately to protect the right than about the capacity, in general, of ordinary politics
adequately to do so.
16. See William J. Brennan, Why Have a Bill of Rights? 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 426
(1989) (H. L. A. Hart Lecture, delivered on May 24, 1989 at University College, Oxford): "The
genius of the Magna Carta, as well as its longevity, lay partly in its creation of a device for
resolving grievances and compelling the Crown to abide by the committee of barons' decision.
Paper promises whose enforcement depends wholly on the promisor's goodwill have rarely been
worth the parchment on which they were inked."
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Thus far I have suggested why the members of a political community (or some of them) might opt for the constitutional strategy for
establishing a right. I have suggested, that'is, why some of the present
members of a political community might want to try to make it especially difficult for the future members (or for themselves at a future
time) to undo certain of their deeds. I have said nothing, however, in
support of the proposition that when the future becomes the present,
the present should acquiesce in the efforts of the past to tie its hands.
In particular, I have not explained why we, the living members of the
American political community, should support the constitutional strategy (including judicial review) for which long-dead members of the
American political community opted17 when they were the living members of the community and we were not even born. The Constitution
begins: "We the People of the United States ...do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Well, "We
the People of the United States" now living did not, not even the oldest
among us, establish the basic features of American government-its
various basic institutions, institutional arrangements, and practices. 8
(This is not to deny that to some extent, of course, American government is continually being re-established.) The question is not whether
they (the past) had (what were for them) good reasons for opting for
the constitutional strategy. The question, rather, is whether we (the
present) have (what are for us) good reasons for maintaining, rather
than disestablishing, what they bequeathed us. In particular, is judicial
review, as it has come down to us,1 9 a practice "We the People of the
United States" now living should support, or is it, instead, a practice
we should oppose?20
17. Or arguably opted. See Appendix A to this lecture.
18. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 925
(1990): "The rhetorical flourish of 'We the People' cannot obscure the simple fact that it is
they-the drafters, ratifiers, voters, and judges whose mortality has deprived them of an ongoing
stake in political affairs-not we, who have made most of the decisions embodied in our constitutional tradition."
19. 1 say "as it has come down to us" because the modern practice of judicial review may
not be identical to the original practice. See Appendix A to this lecture.
20. Sunstein writes that "[t]he precommitment strategy permits the people to protect democratic processes against their own potential excesses or misjudgments." Sustein, supra note 15, at
637. But the main point of the constitutional strategy is to tie the hands, not so much of the
generation opting for the strategy, but of future generations. That it may not be morally problematic for us to tie our own hands, to some end, certainly does not entail that it is not morally
problematic for use to tie someone else's hands, even to the same end. Thus, we must inquire not
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The argument for judicial review, the reason we should support
the practice, is simple: Judicial review serves us well-not perfectly,
but well-as a mechanism for protecting the Constitution of the United
States; the obvious alternatives seem palpably inferior; and unless and
until we identify and establish a better mechanism, we should continue
to support the practice rather than oppose it. In his Hart Lecture at
Oxford University, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., said:
One can imagine a variety of means for redressing violations of fundamental legal rights. Individuals might appeal, for example, to some
nonjudicial branch of government authorized to discipline the alleged
offender-complaining to the executive about legislative overreaching,
for instance, or vice versa. Alternatively, coordinate branches of government could act on their own initiative. Or proposed legislation
could be reviewed by a special constitutional court or commission,
such as France's Constitutional Council. Or citizens themselves could
initiate review by judges empowered to invalidate laws that trench
upon protected rights, to halt official conduct that invades those
rights, and to order relief for past injuries. In my view, America's
experience with the last of these alternatives is the most sensible, effective device for protecting personal liberties. This is particularly true
if judges may only be removed for good cause and if their salaries
may not be reduced, thus enhancing their independence of decision. It
is essential to the defense of liberty that individuals be able to bring
their own claims, rather than wait on the decisions of officers of agencies that lack the same stake in the aggrieved party's freedoms. And
the importance of passing judgment on the propriety of legislation or
government conduct in a concrete setting cannot be overestimated; not
all laws are meaningfully subject to challenge before they have been
placed in operation and their ramifications become plain, which is all
that an advisory body passing on legislation could consider. 1
The argument for judicial review has force, of course, only for
those who believe that the Constitution of the United States is worth
protecting. Is it? More precisely, is the constitutional strategy pursued
by our political ancestors worth maintaining; are the various constitutional directives they issued worth protecting? In particular: (1) Are
the various constitutional directives our political ancestors issued-in
particular, the various constitutional directives regarding rights and libmerely why the present generation of a political community might want to pursue the constitutional strategy; we must also inquire why a later generation of the community might want to
acquiesce in that strategy.
21. Brennan, supra note 16, at 426-27.
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erties and other limits on governmental power-so important (if important at all) that they merit their status as "supreme law?" (2) Even if
they are so important, should those various directives be placed beyond
22
the reach of ordinary politics?
As evidence that for many constitutional directives issued by our
political ancestors an affirmative answer to the question of their importance is not controversial, consider this fact: The Charter of Paris for a
New Europe, signed in Paris on November 21, 1990, by the heads of
state or government of the thirty-four member nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including many advanced
industrial nations with which the United States has a close politicalmoral affinity, specifies the following rights and liberties as among the
human rights and fundamental freedoms [that] are the birthright of
all human beings, . . . inalienable and are guaranteed by law: [The
right of every individual, without discrimination, to] freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion or belief, freedom of expression,
freedom of association and peaceful assembly, freedom of movement,
[freedom from] arbitrary arrest or detention, [freedom from] torture
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, [the
right] to know and act upon his rights, to participate in free and fair
elections, to fair and public trial if charged with an offense, to own
property ...and to exercise individual enterprise, to enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights.
The Charter declares that "[f]ull respect for these precepts is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe. '23 The Charter's "human rights and fundamental freedoms" are either identical or
very similar to many of the rights and liberties our political ancestors
constitutionalized. (Because there can be disagreement, and often is,
about precisely what right or liberty our political ancestors, in ratifying
a particular constitutional provision, constitutionalized, ' I should say
that the Charter's rights and freedoms are identical or very similar to
22. It simply will not work to say that we, the living, have "consented" to the Constitution:
Few of us have consented. Arguments based on "hypothetical," not actual, consent are, at bottom,
arguments about what we have reason to accept (or no reason to reject): What reasons do we have
for accepting, and therefore for protecting, the various constitutional directives issued by our political ancestors? That is simply a verbal variation on the question I am addressing.
23. For excerpts from the Charter see Summit in Europe; Excerpts from the Charter of
Paris for a New Europe as Signed Yesterday, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at A16.
24. There can be disagreement, too, about whether a right or a liberty as constitutionalized
by our political ancestors is a right or a liberty against only the national government or, instead,
against both the national government and the governments of the states.
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many of the rights and liberties our political ancestors constitutionalized on any plausible account of what they constitutionalized.)
But that many of the constitutional directives issued by our political ancestors are of fundamental importance does not entail that every
such directive should be placed beyond the reach of ordinary politics-does not entail, that is, that we should distrust the capacity of
ordinary politics adequately to protect every such directive. Should we
distrust the capacity of ordinary politics, whether the ordinary politics
of the national government or that of the states (or both)? The fact
that our political ancestors, now dead, did so does not conclude the
question whether we, now living, should do so. As I argue elsewhere in
the book from which this lecture is drawn, there are good reasons for
being skeptical about the capacity of ordinary politics adequately to
protect all of the most important constitutional directives issued by our
political ancestors. But it is not necessary to rely on such skepticism in
making the argument for judicial review.
Assume that although we (the living) would and should place beyond the reach of ordinary politics many constitutional directives issued
by our political ancestors, we neither would nor should place beyond
the reach of ordinary politics every constitutional directive of fundamental importance they (the dead) placed beyond its reach. Assume,
too, that not every constitutional directive issued by our political ancestors is so important, if important at all, that it merits its status as supreme law, much less its immunity to ordinary politics. It does not follow that because we would/should not place beyond the reach of
ordinary politics a directive they placed beyond its reach, we should not
acquiesce in their strategy to constitutionalize the directive. Even if we
should be much less skeptical about the capacity of ordinary politics
adequately to protect the directive than they were, we should want the
Court to continue to protect the directive as a constitutional directive-a directive beyond the reach of ordinary politics-unless and until we can disestablish the directive in a way that is less problematic
than the Court continuing to protect the directive: Some ways of disestablishing a directive, after all-the President of the United States unilaterally picking and choosing which constitutional directives he will
respect, for example, or the Supreme Court unilaterally picking and
choosing which constitutional directives it will protect-may well be
much more problematic, all things considered, than simply continuing
to live with the directive until it can be disestablished in a relatively
unproblematic way.
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I do not mean to deny the possibility that, depending both on the
nature of a constitutional directive issued by our political ancestors and
on the relevant particularities of context, it is less problematic, all
things considered, for the Court unilaterally to discontinue protecting
the directive, or for the President unilaterally to discontinue respecting
it, than for the Court to continue protecting the directive, or for the
President to continue respecting it, until the directive can be disestablished in a relatively unproblematic way. But that possibility seems
marginal. Who among us would be comfortable with the politically unaccountable Court, or even the politically accountable President, exercising such a large power-the power to pick and choose which constitutional directives will be protected or respected-even if in some
imaginable, if unlikely, circumstance we might be willing to concede
that, all things considered, a judicial or a presidential nullification of a
directive constitutionalized by our political ancestors is the lesser or
least of evils?
One unproblematic way of disestablishing a constitutional directive issued by our political ancestors, of course, is the amendment process specified by Article V of the Constitution. Whether the Article V
process is the only unproblematic way to disestablish a constitutional
directive is a separate question. The Article V process is surely the
least problematic way. It seems implausible that the Article V process
is the only morally legitimate way to alter the Constitution, 5 even if it
is the only constitutionally legitimate way. (Whether the Article V
process is the only constitutionally legitimate way to amend the Constitution is a matter of controversy.)2 6 In the book from which this lecture
25. "No matter how far they transgress existing rules, successful constitutional conventions,
like those of 1787-89, are unlikely to be perceived as outlaws. If they prosper, they will be founders." Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 7 CONST. COMM. 434, 440-41 (1990) (reviewing Russell L.
Caplan, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION [19881). See Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 CONN. J. INT'L.
L. 445 (1991). But cf. Russell Hardin, WHY A CONSTITUTION? THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 100, 102, 113 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989):
"Contracts are generally backed by external sanctions; constitutions are more nearly
backed by default, by the difficulty of recoordinating on an alternative arrangement. . . . [Once we have settled on a constitutional arrangement, it is not likely to be
in the interest of some of us then to try to renege on the arrangement. And this is
generally true not because we will be coerced to abide if we choose not to but because
we generally cannot do better than to abide. To do better, we would have to carry
enough others with us to set up an alternative, and that will typically be too costly to be
worth the effort."
26. See Akhil R. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). In a subsequent, unpublished addendum (1990), Professor
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is drawn, I suggest a modification in the practice of judicial review
under which the Congress and the President, acting together in their
legislative capacity, would play a larger role, not in amending the Constitution, but in giving shape, in particular contexts, to indeterminate
constitutional values. Perhaps they should play a larger role, too, in
amending the Constitution, as Bruce Ackerman has recently
suggested. 7
To say that the various constitutional directives issued by our political ancestors are worth protecting is not to deny that some of those
directives may be worth protecting only until they can be disestablished
in a relatively unproblematic way. The argument for judicial review,
which presupposes that the various directives constitutionalized by our
political ancestors are worth protecting, is simply that the practice
serves us well as a mechanism for protecting those directives, and that
unless and until we establish a better mechanism, we should continue
to support judicial review rather than oppose it.

The question of the legitimacy of judicial review is much less difficult than the two questions to which the practice of judicial review
gives rise: the question of the approach to constitutional interpretation
the Supreme Court should follow and, especially, the question of the
role the Court should play-how small/passive, or how large/active, a
role-in bringing the interpreted Constitution to bear in resolving constitutional conflicts. I address the first of those questions in Part Two of
this lecture.
Amar argues: "Only if a current majority of deliberate citizens can, if they desire, amend our
Constitution can the document truly be said to derive from 'We the People of the United States,'
here and now, rather than from the hands of a small group of white men ruling us from their
graves. Any contrary reading of Article V would violate the Preamble's promise that the framers'
'Posterity' would continue to enjoy 'the Blessings of Liberty'-most importantly, the liberty of
popular self-governance." Bruce Ackerman, too, has offered an extra-Article V theory of constitutional amendment. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 553 (1990). David Dow rejects "these recent and novel claims." See David Dow, When
Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1990)
(arguing "that the only way to amend the Constitution is in accordance with the mechanism
outlined in article V").
27.

See Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 54-55 (1992).
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Part Two: The Argument for the Originalist Approach
to Judicial Review

The practice of judicial review involves, centrally, the Court interpreting the Constitution in the course of resolving constitutional conflicts. Which approach to the interpretation of the constitutional text,
among the approaches that have been recommended to it, should the
Supreme Court follow? Which approach to constitutional interpretation should inform the practice of judicial review?
The question of the proper judicial approach to constitutional interpretation-to the interpretation of the constitutional text-should
not be confused with the different question, addressed elsewhere in the
book from which this lecture is drawn, of the proper judicial approach
to constitutional specification-to the specification of indeterminate
constitutional norms or directives represented by the constitutional text.
Constitutional adjudication comprises two distinct inquiries. The question addressed in Part Two of this lecture concerns the proper judicial
approach to the first of those inquiries: the interpretive inquiry, the inquiry into what directive or directives a particular provision of the constitutional text represents. The position I defend in this lecture-"originalism"-is a position about the proper judicial approach
to the interpretive inquiry. It bears emphasis that originalism is not a
position about the proper judicial approach to the second of those inquiries: the normative inquiry, the inquiry into what shape to give, in a
particular context, an indeterminate directive represented, or believed
to be represented, by a particular provision of the constitutional text.
Originalism is a position about constitutional interpretation, not about
constitutional specification. Judicial "minimalism," by contrast, which
I discuss elsewhere in the book from which this lecture is drawn, is a
position both about constitutional interpretation and about constitutional specification. (As a position about constitutional interpretation,
judicial minimalism -complements, rather than competes with,
originalism.)
I
Constitutional directives are typically about what the institutions
of government are to be and how power is to be allocated among them,
or about how governmental power is to be limited. What directives is it
legitimate, as a matter of democratic political morality, for the Supreme Court to enforce as constitutionaldirectives-directives that are
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part of "the supreme law of the land"2 8 and that, as a legal matter,29
may not be repealed except ° by means of the amendment process specified by Article V? The "textualist" answer is that the Court may enforce as constitutional only directives represented by the text of the
Constitution. The "nontextualist" answer is that the Court may enforce
as constitutional, not only directives represented by the constitutional
text, but also some directives not so represented.
It is difficult to the point of impossible, in the context of modern
American political-legal culture, to make a persuasive case for nontextualism. The argument for judicial review, presented in Part One of
this lecture, presupposes the importance of protecting the Constitution
of the United States-the Constitution that begins with the words "We
the People of the United States" and, as of 1992, ends with the
Twenty-sixth Amendment. What justification can there be, therefore,
for the Court enforcing, as constitutional, directives not represented by
the Constitution? Recalling that Chief Justice John Marshall's justification for the practice of judicial review, in Marbury v. Madison, appealed to the writtenness of the Constitution," Michael Moore has
commented that "[j]udicial review is easier to justify if it is exercised
with reference only to the written document .... By now, the object of
[constitutional] interpretation should be clear: it is the written document. Hugo Black was right, at least, about this. Black's Constitution-the one he was so fond of pulling out of his pocket-is our only
Constitution."32
Samuel Freeman has asserted that "[olur written Constitution is
• . . only a part[] of our constitution. It plays a significant though nonexclusive role in constitutional interpretation. It is not, and it is not
generally understood to be, the complete representation or embodiment
of all constitutional conditions and institutions. 33 As Freeman has developed the point:
There is . . . a sense of the term "constitution" that designates an
28. Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]his Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....
29. But not as a moral matter. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30. Or arguably except. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
31. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
32. Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107,
122-23 (1989). See id. at 121-23. See also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative
Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1601 (1989).
33. Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 9
L. & PHIL. 327, 369 (1990-91).
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institution .

. .

. In its institutional sense, the political constitution of

any regime is that system of publicly recognized and commonly accepted rules for making and applying those social rules that are laws.
This system of highest-order rules constitutes a political system in
that it defines offices and positions of political authority, with their
respective qualifications, rights, powers, duties, immunities, liabilities,
and so on, and the procedures officials are to observe for making, applying, and enforcing valid laws. As such, the constitution itself cannot be law in an ordinary sense, for what is law within the 34legal system is ultimately identified by reference to its constitution.
There is no a priori reason why a political community cannot put its
constitution (in what Freeman calls the term's "institutional sense") in
writing. And, indeed, the constitution of the American political community has been put in writing, to some extent at least. The Constitution of the United States-that is, the written Constitution-is,
whatever else it is, a "system of publicly recognized and commonly accepted rules for making and applying those social rules that are laws.
This system of highest-order rules constitutes a political system in that
it defines offices and positions of political authority, .

.

. and the proce-

dures officials are to observe for making, applying, and enforcing valid
laws." There can be little doubt, therefore, that the written Constitution is a substantial part, at least, of our constitution. The serious question is whether the written Constitution exhausts our constitution, or
whether, as Freeman has asserted, "[o]ur written Constitution is
only a part[] of our constitution."
I do not claim that the written Constitution exhausts our constitution (in the "institutional sense" of the term). For example, I suggest in
Appendix A to this lecture that the practice of judicial review, as a
constitutive feature of American government, is "constitutional" even if
35
the written Constitution does not establish the practice. But even if
the written Constitution does not exhaust our constitution, the fact remains that insofar as the practice of judicial review is concerned, Freeman is wrong and Moore is right: Our written Constitution is our only
constitution; it is the whole, and not merely a part, of our constitution.
(To say that the written Constitution is our only constitution is not to
prejudge the question of the meaning of the written Constitution; for
example, it is not to prejudge the question whether the written Consti34. Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AFt. 3, 6 (1992).
35. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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tution, or some part of it, has a "natural rights" meaning.) 6 Freeman
to the contrary notwithstanding, the written Constitution is "generally
understood to be the complete representation or embodiment of all constitutional conditions and institutions" that the Supreme Court may
enforce or protect. Freeman may want to make an argument in support
of the nontextualist approach to constitutional adjudication, but it is
difficult to imagine any such argument that would be credible in the
context of modern American political or jurisprudential thought.3 7
Moreover, it is difficult, in the modern period of American constitutional law, 8 even to identify a nontextualist judge. Consider, for example, William J. Brennan, Jr., who is conventionally understood to
have followed an "activist" approach to constitutional adjudication.
Even if an activist, Justice Brennan is clearly not a nontextualist:
36. Nontextualism ought not to be confused with a different position, which Gary Jacobsohn has articulated. According to Jacobsohn,
[T]he written Constitution was meant to embody the natural rights commitments of the
framers. Therefore, judicial appeals to "higher law" are not justifiable when they lead
to a distinction between written and unwritten constitutions, but they are justifiable
insofar as they help explicate and illuminate the written words of the Constitution itself. From this perspective the positivists are correct in their insistence upon the exclusive authority of the written document, but fundamentally misguided in their understanding of the nature of this document, since, as we have seen, the written words do
not preclude a natural rights content. Judges who accept the intermediate position
stated above will not feel free to invoke ideas of natural justice that are not grounded in
the constitutional text. Yet neither will they read the text as if it were a business contract or, worse, as an "unprincipled" document. If the Constitution is a set of rules and
procedures, it is so in part because it flows out of a coherent and knowable, not arbitrary or ever-mutable, set of philosophic presuppositions.
GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION

75 (1986). To reject nontextualism, therefore, is not necessarily to reject "judicial appeals to
'higher law.'"
37. For an argument that at the time of the founding of the United States, courts sometimes followed the nontextualist approach to constitutional adjudication, see Suzanna Sherry, The
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987). But see Helen K. Michael,
The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism:Did the Founders Contemplate
Judicial Enforcement of 'Unwritten' Individual Rights? 69 N.C. L. REv. 421 (1991) (arguing
against Sherry). My claim is that it is difficult to justify the nontextualist approach in the context
of modern American political-legal culture. Cf. Sherry, this note, at 1176:
By approximately 1820, . . . the reliance on natural law was waning, disappearing entirely within a few years. It is this nineteenth century rejection of the notions of natural
rights that has most influenced modern constitutional law. After two brief flirtations
with decisionmaking on the basis of natural law, the Supreme Court since 1937 has
made a consistent and at least partially successful attempt to link all of its decisions to
specific clauses of the Constitution, even when doing so stretches the language to the
limits of credibility.
38. The period, that is, since 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), was decided.
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But if America's experience demonstrates that paper projections are
not a sufficient guarantor of liberty, it also suggests that they are a
necessary one, particularly in times of crisis. Without a textual anchor
for their decisions, judges would have to rely on some theory of natural right, or some allegedly shared standard of the ends and limits of
government, to strike down invasive legislation. But an appeal to normative ideals that lack any mooring in the written law . . . would in
societies like ours be suspect, because it would represent so profound
an aberration from majoritarian principles ....
A text ... helps tether
[judges'] discretion. I would be the last to cabin judges' power to keep
the law vital, to ensure that it remains abreast of the progress in
man's intellect and sensibilities. Unbounded freedom is, however, another matter. One can imagine a system of governance that accorded
judges almost unlimited discretion, but it would be one reminiscent of
the rule by Platonic Guardians that Judge Learned Hand so feared. It
is not one, I think, that would gain allegiance in either of our
countries.3 9
To reject nontextualism-as Justice Brennan, for example,
does-is not to deny that in enforcing, and therefore in specifying, an
indeterminate directive represented by the constitutional text, a judge
must rely on premises, including normative premises, not represented
by the constitutional text. (Elsewhere in the book from which this lecture is drawn, I discuss the judicial process of specifying indeterminate
constitutional directives.)
I take it for granted, then, that the Supreme Court may enforce as
constitutional only directives represented by the text of the constitution.
II
It is not always clear, however, what directive (or directives) a
provision of the constitutional text represents. Moreover, because any
text can be, and in particular because constitutional provisions often
are, understood in different ways by different people-whether different
people at the same time or different people at different times-the
question "What directive does this constitutional provision represent?"
39. See supra note 16, at 432. However activist his approach to constitutional adjudication
may have been, Justice Brennan is best understood not only as a textualist, but as an originalist
(in the sense of originalism presented and defended in this lecture). See Michael W. McConnell,
A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 89, 92 n.16 (1988).
"Traditional constitutionalism is not hostile to judicial enforcement of aspirational principles-if
they can fairly be discovered in the text, structure, and purposes of the Constitution." Id. at 100.
(Professor McConnell, a prominent originalist, served as Justice Brennan's law clerk.)
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must be met by the question: "This constitutional provision as understood by whom?" As I am about to explain, the question "Which approach to constitutional interpretation should the Court follow?" is the
question "Whose understanding of the constitutional text should be
deemed authoritative-whose understanding should be 'privileged'-for
purposes of constitutional adjudication?"
Whose understanding should be privileged? The "originalist" answer is that the "original" understanding should be privileged, that the
constitutional text as originally understood should be deemed authoritative for purposes of constitutional adjudication. More precisely, and
ideally, the understanding of a constitutional provision by "the People"
at the time the provision was constitutionalized should be privileged,
because they were sovereign. The Constitution begins: "We the People
of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America." The ratification of a proposed constitutional provision by the representatives of the People should therefore be
taken to presuppose the People's understanding of the provision. Surely
it should not be taken to presuppose a secret understanding not shared
with, or by, the People.4"
The point can be put in terms of original "meaning" as well as of
original "understanding:" The meaning of a constitutional provision to
the People at the time the provision was constitutionalized should, according to originalism, be privileged. To speak of how a text is understood by someone is to speak of what the text means to her, and vice
versa.
Not all the People invariably pay attention, however, and not all
who do pay attention, or try to, invariably achieve access to all the
relevant information. It is a reasonable working hypothesis that the understanding of a constitutional provision by those who represented the
People in the constitutional process is a close approximation to how the
provision was understood by the People, or would have been understood by them had they been paying attention and had they achieved
access to all the relevant information. Therefore, the understanding of
a constitutional provision by those who represented the People in the
40. Whose understanding of a statutory provision, as distinct from a constitutional provision, should be privileged for purposes of statutory adjudication? The understanding of the People
at the time the provision was legislated? Or the understanding of the People's representatives, who
legislated the provision? Statutes, unlike the Constitution, do not typically begin with "We the
People," and the process of legislating a statutory provision is often much less public than the
process of ratifying a constitutional provision.
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constitutional process-in particular, the ratifiers' understanding-may, according to originalism, be privileged. 4 1 Moreover, with respect to constitutional amendments proposed by the Congress" 2-as, so
far, all the constitutional amendments have been-the congressional
understanding may fairly be taken to indicate the ratifiers' understanding. In writing about the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Alexander Bickel observed:
[T]he debates of the Congress which submitted, and the journals and
documents of the legislatures which ratified, the amendment provide
the most direct and unimpeachable indication of original purpose and
understanding ....

Of these two sets of materials, the Congressional

41. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
144 (1989):
Though I have written of the understanding of the ratifiers of the Constitution, since
they enacted it and made it law, that is actually a shorthand formulation, because what
the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public
of that time would have understood the words to mean. It is important to be clear about
this. The search is not for a subjective intention. If someone found a letter from George
Washington to Martha telling her that what he meant by the power to lay taxes was
not what other people meant, that would not change our reading of the Constitution in
the slightest. Nor would the subjective intentions of all the members of a ratifying
convention alter anything. When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what
those words ordinarily mean. If Congress enacted a statute outlawing the sale of automatic rifles and did so in the Senate by a vote of 51 to 49, no court would overturn a
conviction because two senators in the majority testified that they really had intended
only to prohibit the use of such rifles. They said "sale" and "sale" it is. Thus, the
common objection to the philosophy of original understanding-that Madison kept his
notes of the convention at Philadelphia secret for many years-is off the mark. He
knew that what mattered was public understanding, not subjective intentions. Madison
himself said that what mattered was the intention of the ratifying conventions. His
notes of the discussions at Philadelphia are merely evidence of what informed public
men of the time thought the words of the Constitution meant. Since many of them were
also delegates to the various state ratifying conventions, their understanding informed
[W]hat counts is what the public understood. Law
the debates in those conventions ....
is a public act. Secret reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is
how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time. The
original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials,
such as debates at the convention, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in
use at the time, and the like.
By "the public of that time" does Bork mean, not the whole public, but that particular public,
namely, the enfranchised, on whose behalf the provision was ratified? Or does he mean a public
larger than the enfranchised, on the theory that at least some of those who were not enfranchised
were being virtually, though not actually, represented by the ratifiers? On "virtual representation," see JOHN H. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 82-87
(1980).
42. For the text of Article V of the Constitution, which concerns the amendment process,
see supra text, at 616-17.
LAW
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rank ...first in importance. It may perhaps be said that

whatever they establish constitutes a rebuttable presumption. For it is
not unrealistic, in the main, to assume notice of Congressional purpose in the state legislatures. A showing of ratification on the basis of
an understanding different from that revealed by Congressional
materials must carry the burden of proof. And, of course, the ratifying states
are a chorus of voice; a discordant one among them proves
43
little.
The "nonoriginalist" answer to the question of the understanding
that should be privileged, by contrast, is that the understanding of
some person or persons other than the understanding of the People at
the time the provision was constitutionalized, or of their representatives, should be deemed authoritative for purposes of judicial review.
The understanding of what person or persons? The understanding of
the judge enforcing the provision? The understanding of the present
generation of the People-or, if no one understanding of the provision
is shared by all members of the present generation of the People, the
understanding of some members of the present generation? Which
members? ("[T]he central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the impossibility of achieving any consensus on
what, precisely, is to replace original meaning, once that is abandoned.")4 Whatever a particular nonoriginalist's response, nonoriginalism does not presuppose that the understanding of a constitutional provision by the People at the time the provision was constitutionalized, or
of their representatives, is different from the understanding that, according to nonoriginalism, should be privileged. Nonoriginalism holds
only that whether or not-and, therefore, even if-the original understanding is different from the latter, the latter understanding, not the
former, should be deemed authoritative for purposes of judicial review.
According to originalism, then, the relevant question about a constitutional provision is: "What directive does this provision, as originally understood, represent?" An equivalent inquiry is: "What constitutional directive did the People-or those who represented them, in
particular the ratifiers-understand this provision to communicate?
What constitutional directive did our political ancestors mean to issue,
in ratifying this provision?" According to nonoriginalism, however, the
relevant question is: "What directive does this provision, as understood
43.
44.

M. BICKEL. POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 214 (1965).
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862-63 (1989).
ALEXANDER
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by X, represent?" (Who X is depends, of course, on how a nonoriginalist responds to the question in the preceding paragraph: "The understanding of what person or persons?") An equivalent inquiry: "What
directive does X understand this provision to represent?"
Which approach to constitutional interpretation-originalism or
nonoriginalism-should the Court follow; which approach should inform the practice of judicial review? What should the object of the
Court's interpretive inquiry be: the original understanding or a
nonoriginal understanding? That is, in enforcing a constitutional provision, should the Court be concerned to enforce the directive represented
by the provision as originally understood, the constitutional directive
our political ancestors meant to issue in ratifying the provision-or, instead, should it be concerned to enforce the directive represented by the
provision as understood by X? The question is far from merely an academic one. The directive represented by a constitutional provision as
originally understood may well be different from the directive represented by the provision as understood by X.
Consider, for example, the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall make no.law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. . . ." Does the free exercise
clause represent only the directive that Congress is not to discriminate
against one or more religions, or does it represent the directive that
Congress is not only not to discriminate against one or more religions,
but that even when regulating behavior in a nondiscriminatory way,
Congress is to tread as lightly around religious practice as it practically
can. Does the assistance of counsel clause of the Sixth Amendment
("[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense") represent only the directive that government is not to prevent the accused from having a
lawyer, or does it represent the directive that government is not only
not to prevent the accused from having a lawyer, but that when the
accused is unable to procure a lawyer for himself, government is to
provide one? Does the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment ("[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States")
represent only the directive that states are not to regulate protected
privileges or immunities in a discriminatory way (on the basis of race,
for example), or does it represent the directive that states are not to
regulate protected privileges or immunities in a discriminatory or oth-
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erwise unreasonable way.4" The answer to such questions may well depend on whether one is asking about a constitutional provision as originally understood or, instead, about the provision as understood by some
person or persons other than the People, or their representatives, at the
time the provision was constitutionalized.
In the remainder of this lecture, I want to elaborate the originalist
position more fully-the position that in enforcing a constitutional provision, the Court should be concerned to enforce the directive represented by the provision as originally understood, the directive the People at the time the provision was constitutionalized, or their
representatives, understood the provision to communicate, the directive
they meant to issue-and then explain why the originalist position is
much stronger, in the context of modern American political-legal culture, than nonoriginalism.
Before I move on, however, I want to comment on a statement by
Ronald Dworkin: "The problem a judge 'committed' to original understanding has is not deciding what an abstract provision says-it says
something as abstract as the words it uses-but deciding what impact
it has in concrete cases. He is trying to establish the Constitution's
meaning in that sense, and it is no help to tell him that he must first
discover its meaning."4 Originalists, like Robert Bork (whose position
Dworkin was criticizing in the quoted passage), do not suggest, however, nor does their advice presuppose or entail, that the problem an
originalist judge faces is deciding what a constitutional provision-a
piece of the constitutional text-abstractly worded or otherwise, says.
They understand that the problem is deciding what the piece of text
means. In particular, the problem is deciding what the text means in
two senses: first, deciding what directive the text, as originally understood, represents, and second, deciding what that directive means, what
it requires, in the context of the conflict to be resolved. An originalist
judge-indeed, any judge, originalist or not-must first "discover" the
meaning of the text, she must first identify the directive represented by
the text, before she can address the question of the meaning of the
directive represented by the text-before, that is, she can decide what
the directive means for the conflict at hand and therefore what it shall
mean for relevantly similar conflicts thereafter, before she can, in that
45.
(1992).
46.

See Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 103 YALE L.J. 1385
Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 657, 668 n.9 (1990).

-
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sense, "establish" the meaning of the directive. A judge simply cannot
do the latter until she has first done the former.
Perhaps Dworkin believes that the question of a constitutional provision's meaning is a nonquestion. Perhaps he believes, for example,
that the question, "What does the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment, as originally understood, mean, what directive does it represent?" is not a serious question. Perhaps he wants to try to minimize
the question by answering (impatiently?) "It means what it says, that
'Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . .;' that is the directive the text, as originally understood, represents; our political ancestors meant what they said and said what they
meant, no more, no less!" Such a response, however, is conspicuously
unhelpful. We do not always succeed in communicating precisely what
we mean to communicate, even when we succeed in saying precisely
what we meant to say, and there is certainly no reason to assume a
priori that in saying what they did, in writing a constitutional provision
as they did, our political ancestors invariably succeeded in communicating precisely what they meant to communicate (even if they invariably succeeded in saying what they meant to say), that they invariably
succeeded in communicating precisely the directive they meant to communicate. And, indeed, with respect to the free exercise clause, they
did not succeed in communicating precisely the directive they meant to
communicate: In the American political community, there is no widely
shared understanding of the meaning of what they said, of the directive
they meant to communicate by saying what they did. According to
some scholars, the free exercise clause (as originally understood) represents only the directive that Congress is not to discriminate against one
or more religions; according to others, it represents the directive that
Congress is not only not to discriminate against one or more religions,
but that even when regulating behavior in a nondiscriminatory way,
Congress is to tread as lightly around religious practice as it practically
47
can.
It is not surprising that sometimes in the American political community there is no widely shared understanding of the meaning of
something our political ancestors said (wrote) in the Constitution, of
the directive they meant to communicate by saying (writing) what they
47. See Employment Division, Oregon Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
2605 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
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did. Sometimes texts-not least, old texts-are or become, in the life of
the community, opaque, vague, ambiguous, etc. Sometimes, therefore,
a text must undergo a serious interpretive effort-a serious effort at
translation or decoding-if the message it was meant to communicate
is to be received. Constitutional texts are no exception: Constitutional
provisions are sometimes opaque, vague, ambiguous, etc., and sometimes, therefore, a constitutional provision must undergo a serious interpretive effort if the directive it was. meant to communicate is to be
received. Therefore, sometimes the question of a constitutional provision's meaning, of what directive it represents, cannot usefully be answered by a statement of what the provision says.
The question of the meaning of a constitutionalprovision can be a
.serious question, therefore, and almost certainly is a serious question in
the absence of a widely shared understanding of the meaning of the
provision-in the absence, that is, of a widely shared understanding of
what directive the provision represents. A judge must first answer that
question before "establishing," in the context of the case at hand, the
meaning of the directive represented by the provision. Even in the presence of a widely shared contemporary understanding of the meaning of
a constitutional provision, the question of the original meaning of the
provision-of what directive the provision, as originally understood,
represents-can be a serious question: The widely shared present understanding may diverge radically from the original understanding.
Of course, the question of the meaning of a constitutional provision is not invariably a serious one. If there is, in a community, a
widely shared understanding of the meaning of a text, the question
"What does it mean?" if posed by a member of the community, may
elicit the impatient reply "It means what it says!" Consider, for example, Section 3 of Article 1 of the Constitution, which provides, inter
alia, that "[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State ....
" Because there is a widely shared understanding of the meaning of the provision in the American political
community, the question "What does the provision mean?" (if posed by
a member of the community) would seem strange. (If posed by someone not a member of the community, the question would not seem
strange, or as strange. That there is in a community a widely shared
understanding of the meaning of any provision or text is, of course, a
contingent fact, not a necessary one. The situation could be otherwise.)
We might be tempted to reply-even though the object of the question
is, not what the provision says, but what it means-"It means what it
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says, that there shall be two senators-no more, no less-from each
state." This is not to deny that to say of a text "It means what it says!"
is to interpret the text, just to emphasize that the question "What does
it mean?" may seem strange in the presence of a widely shared understanding of the meaning of the text. But the question "What does the
free exercise clause mean?" does not seem strange. Given the absence
of a shared understanding of the clause, the (Dworkinian?) reply "The
free exercise clause means what it says!" would seem, not merely
strange, but perverse."'
III
According to the originalist approach to the interpretation of a
constitutional provision, the object of the Supreme Court's interpretive
inquiry should be the directive (or directives) represented by the provision as originally understood: the directive the People at the time the
provision was constitutionalized, or their representatives, understood
the provision to communicate, the directive they meant to issue. A
common objective to originalism is that there may well be no single
directive a sufficiently large number of the People, or of their representatives in the constitutional process, understood a constitutional provision to communicate; there may well be, in that sense, no single original understanding, no single directive a sufficiently large number of our
political ancestors meant to issue.
That possibility is extremely unlikely. Constitutional provisions do
not emerge out of thin air. They are efforts to deal with real problems.
Consider, for example, the important second sentence of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." There is no serious ques48. Because there are competing understandings of the meanings of the free exercise clause,
of what directive the clause represents-competing understandings intratemporally, in the present,
and perhaps also intertemporally, between past and present, in particular, between the time the
clause was ratified and the present-the question "What does the clause mean?" is incomplete:
What does (did) the clause mean to whom, how is (was) it understood by whom? Many of the
most important constitutional provisions-in particular, many constitutional provisions regarding
rights or liberties-are like the free exercise clause in that, there is not only no widely shared
understanding of the meaning of the provisions, of what directives the provisions represent, there
are, in the American political community, competing understandings (both intratermporally and
intertemporally).
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tion whether that sentence was understood, by virtually all the persons
who constitutionalized it, to communicate at least a set of directives
about discrimination against persons "of African descent." 4 9 As the Supreme Court said in The Slaughter-House Cases, "The most cursory
glance at [the three post-Civil War Amendments] discloses a unity of
purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times, which
cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning.-. . . [T]he one pervading purpose found in
them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of
them would have been even suggested[, is] the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."50
There is no serious question, either, whether the second sentence of
Section 1 was meant to communicate a set of directives not just about
discrimination against persons of African descent, but about discrimination based on race.
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection ....
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of
the Congress which proposed the thirteenth [amendment], it forbids
any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or
the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican
or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be
trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the
States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of
these [amendments], that protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent. 51
Similarly, in 1880 the Court wrote: "Nor if a law should be passed
excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of
its inconsistency with the spirit of the [fourteenth] amendment." 52 The
serious, and disputed, question is whether the sentence was understood,
by a sufficiently large number of those who constitutionalized it, to
communicate any directives about matters other than discrimination
based on race-even, perhaps, about matters other than discrimina49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
majority,

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872).
Id. at 67, 71.
Id. at 72.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
The four dissenting justices in the Slaughter-House Cases, but not the Slaughter-House
thought that Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to deal with discrimi-
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tion. In any event, the objection that there is no single directive our
political ancestors meant to issue in ratifying a particular constitutional
provision is best tested by scrutinizing the available relevant historical
materials.
None of this is to suggest that the Court will always be able to
identify easily, or with certainty, the directive represented by a constitutional provision as originally understood. But it is to suggest that the
Court will usually be able to reach a plausible conclusion about original
meaning. Sometimes the best the Court will be able to do will be to
construct an original understanding on the basis of what we might
think of as a hypothetical conversation with those in the past whose
understanding counts: The effort must be to discern, on the basis of the
available historical materials, which directive they most likely would
have chosen, in the conversation, confronted by the various possibilities-the various candidate directives-as being the one that best captures the purpose or point or meaning of what they did. That
counterfactual project, though difficult, is hardly impossible. That
sometimes the best the Court can do is to construct an original understanding is, for purposes of the originalist approach, good enough; that
sometimes the Court can do no more hardly counts as an argument for
a nonoriginalist approach. (Of course, the counterfactual project described here will often leave a judge ample room for "discretionary"
judgments about original meaning; as I explain elsewhere in the book
from which this lecture is drawn, "the indeterminacy of history" is one
reason why, the view of some originalists to the contrary notwithstanding, originalism does not entail judicial minimalism.)
Indeed, if the Court were usually unable to reach a plausible conclusion-if the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation resulted in treating any significant part of the Constitution as a dead
letter-that would surely count as a powerful argument against the
claim that the originalist approach is the proper approach. But the
originalist approach does not so result. Consider, in that regard, this
statement by Robert Bork: "The judge who cannot make out the meaning of a provision is in exactly the same circumstance as a judge who
has no Constitution to work with. There being nothing to work with,
the judge should refrain from working. A provision whose meaning
cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision that . .. is obliterated
past deciphering by an ink blot. No judge is entitled to interpret an ink
nation beyond just racial discrimination. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83.
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blot on the ground that there must be something under it." 54 Bork then
adds:
Oddly enough, the people who relish agnosticism about the [original]
meaning of our most basic compact do not explore the consequences
of their notion. They view the impossibility of knowing what the Constitution means as justification for saying that it means anything they
would prefer it to mean. But they too easily glide over a difficulty
fatal to their conclusion. If the meaning of the Constitution is unknowable, if, so far as we can tell, it is written in undecipherable hieroglyphics, the conclusion is not that the judge may write his own Constitution. The conclusion is that judges must stand aside and let
current democratic majorities rule, because there is no law superior to
theirs."
Bork's polemical point is overdrawn. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that on some occasion the Court, after painstaking historical inquiry, is finally unable to identify-that, in the Court's view, history is
finally silent about-what directive a constitutional provision as originally understood represents. What then? An originalist Court does not
have to treat the provision as a dead letter: If the provision is presently
understood to represent some directive, the Court can reasonably presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the provision as
originally understood represents the same directive. The Court need not
presume, as a kind of default strategy, that the discontinuities in the
political-moral life of the historically extended American political community dominate the continuities.
Another common objection to originalism-which is similar to the
first objection and, indeed, perhaps merely a variation on it-is that
originalism is unable to deal with what is probably the most fundamental interpretive problem, namely, identifying the level of generality of
the directive represented by a constitutional provision: For example, a
judge cannot determine, pursuant to the originalist approach, whether
the directive the People, or their representatives, understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to communicate is only about discrimination based on race or whether it is about
discrimination more generally, of which racial discrimination is simply
an instance, 56 or even whether it is about more than discrimination.
54. BORK. supra note 41, at 166.
55. BORK, supra note 41, at 166-67.
56. See Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, NEW YORK REV., Aug. 13, 1987, at 6:
History alone might be able to show that some particular concrete opinion, like the
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This objection seems mistaken. As Bork has explained:
The role of a judge committed to the philosophy of original understanding is .. .to find the meaning of a text-a process which in-

cludes finding its degree of generality, which is part of its meaning. . . .[A] judge should state the principle at the level of generality
that the text and historical evidence warrant .... [Originalism] avoids
the problem of the level of generality ... by finding the level of gener-

ality that interpretation of the words, structure, and history of the
[constitutional provision] fairly supports."'
According to originalism, then, a judge should try not to articulate the
directive represented by a constitutional provision (as originally understood) at a level of generality any broader-or any narrower-than the
relevant materials ("words, structure, and history") warrant. Of
course, deciding what level of generality the relevant materials warrant
may often be a difficult task. It is a mistake-for some, it is wishful
thinking-to suppose that the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is always or even often easy. The originalist approach is
often difficult.5 8
In his more polemical moods, Bork complains about the tendency
of some "liberals"-both liberal judges and liberal scholars-to
"overgeneralize" the original meaning of constitutional provisions. For
example: "[Although not all] the theorists of liberal constitutional revisionism"-Bork kindly includes me in that group 59 -"would agree that
they have rejected the original understanding, . . . I think it can be
shown that they have generalized that understanding so greatly, stated
it at such a high level of abstraction, that virtually no one who voted to
opinion that school segregation was not unconstitutional, was widely shared within the
group of legislators and others mainly responsible for a constitutional amendment. But
it can never determine precisely which general principle or value it would be right to
attribute to them. This is so not because we might fail to gather enough evidence, but
for the more fundamental reason that people's convictions do not divide themselves
neatly into general principles and concrete applications. Rather they take the form of a
more complex structure of layers of generality, so that people regard most of their
convictions as applications of further principles or values more general still. That means
that a judge will have a choice among more or less abstract descriptions of the principle
that he regards the framers as having entrusted to his safekeeping, and the actual decisions he makes, in the exercise of that responsibility, will critically depend on which
description he chooses.
57. BORK, supra note 41, at 149-50.
58. To say that the originalist approach is difficult is not to say that it is impossible. See
MICHAEL J. PERRY. MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 126-27 (1988).
59. See BORK, supra note 41, at 216-17.
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ratify the document would recognize the principles of the theorists as
his own." 6 It would make just as much sense, however, to complain
about the tendency of some ("conservative"?) judges and scholars to
"undergeneralize." Indeed, the complaint that some judges tend to undergeneralize seems the more plausible one with respect to constitutional provisions, like the three clauses of the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (the Privileges or Immunities,
Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses), the language of which is
relatively general. (At least, as it is or probably would be used today,
the language of those clauses is relatively general.) After all, the generality of the language of a constitutional provision is some evidence that
the original meaning of the provision-the directive represented by the
provision as originally understood-is similarly general (and, therefore,
that the directive is relatively indeterminate).
Interpreters who emphasize extrinsic evidence of the founders' intent
tend to ignore the generality of the text and to substitute much narrower conceptions of intent. The founders focused on the specific
problems most salient to their lives, but they constitutionalized general principles that seem designed to cover whole classes of similar
problems. What they left a record of having specifically and consciously intended is often a small subset of the text they proposed and
ratified. Interpretation limited to specific and provable intentions thus
tends to be fatally inconsistent with the constitutional text. 6'
Of course, it is always possible that-and sometimes merits inquiry
whether-language that appears general to us in the present appeared
much less general, if not specific, to them in the past.6 2 Nonetheless,
"[clertainly when most readers agree that a particular clause or phrase
60. BORK, supra note 41, at 187.
61. Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 683, 687 (1990). Recall. Bork's statement, quoted in the text accompanying note
57, that "a judge should state the principle at the level of generality that the text and historical
evidence warrant." Just two pages earlier in his book, however, Bork said: "The Constitution
states its principles in majestic generalities that we know cannot be taken as sweepingly as the
words alone might suggest." BORK, supra note 41, at 147. 1 wonder how Bork would reconcile the
two statements. Bork seems to assume that "historical evidence" warrants a construal of original
meaning narrower than the construal warranted by textual language alone. As a generalization
about all constitutional provisions, that assumption is surely a perilous one (even if it is true of
some provisions that historical evidence warrants a construal of original meaning narrower than
that warranted by text alone). If that is indeed Bork's assumption/generalization-how else might
the two statements be reconciled?-then Bork has fallen prey to wishful thinking.
62. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1215, 1224-25, 1238-39 (1990).
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means one thing, the burden of persuasion ought to be on the advocate
of some other meaning. Such a presumption is fully consistent with
[the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation] and a convenient rule of administration."6
In any event, the commitment of an originalist judge is to retrieve
the original meaning of constitutional provisions as accurately as possible and, therefore, neither to over nor to undergeneralize original
meaning. 4

It is important not to confuse the originalist approach I am
presenting here with another version often the target of critics of
originalism.15 Assume that-the directive represented by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause as originally understood is that states are not to
regulate the protected privileges or immunities on the basis of race-in
particular, they are not to deny them to any person on the basis of race.
Assume further that the ratifiers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
(whose understanding of the clause we are accepting as a proxy for the
understanding of the People they represented) happened not to believe
that the Clause proscribed racially segregated public schools. According to a problematic version of originalism, segregated schools therefore
63. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw.U.L. REV. 226, 235 (1988). See McConnell, supra note
47, at 1115-16 (discussing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment): "While we cannot
rule out the possibility that the term 'prohibiting' might impliedly be limited to laws that prohibit
the exercise of religion in a particular way-that is, in a discriminatory fashion-we should at
least begin with the presumption that the words carry as broad a meaning as their natural usage."
64. The problem, of course, is that there will often be available a range of historically plausible readings-some more general, some less so-of the original meaning. In that sense, the historical inquiry constitutive of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is often indeterminate. I discuss the indeterminacy of originalism in the book from which this lecture is drawn.
See supra note I.
65. See BORK, supra note 41, at 218 (criticizing Leonard Levy's "highly oversimplified version of the philosophy of original understanding that bears little resemblance to the theory set out
in this book .... No even moderately sophisticated originalist holds the view Levy refutes [in his
Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution (1988)]"). The "intentionalist" approach to constitutional interpretation James Boyd White criticizes in his new book bears little resemblance to the
originalist approach presented in this lecture. See JAMES WHITE. JUSTICE As TRANSLATION: AN
ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM, ch. 5: "'Original Intention' in the Slave Cases"
(1990). Cf id. at 114 ("we shall be working out the consequences of at least one version of the
view that the Constitution should be interpreted by reference to the intention of the framers")
(emphasis added). The approach presented here can be elaborated, and in this lecture is elaborated, entirely without reference to authorial intentions.
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do not violate the Clause and may not legitimately be disestablished in
the name of the Clause." According to the originalism I am presenting
here, however, the question whether segregated schools violate the
Clause-the Clause as originally understood-is not to be referred to
the past; it is a question for the present; in particular, it is a question
for the court charged with determining whether such schools violate the
Clause. What is authoritative, for originalism, is the directive the ratifiers understood a constitutional provision to communicate, the directive they meant to issue. That the ratifiers may not have believed that
this or that practice (law, etc.) with which they were familiar violated
a constitutional directive they were issuing-even that they believed
that the practice did not violate the directive-is not determinative. If
in the Court's view a practice does in fact violate a constitutional directive the ratifiers issued, the Court's duty is to invalidate the practice.
Of course, that the ratifiers believed that a practice with which they
were familiar did not violate a constitutional provision they were ratifying is some evidence of what directive the ratifiers understood the provision to communicate, of what directive they meant to issue in ratifying the provision; in particular, it may suggest that the directive the
ratifiers meant to issue does not have precisely the shape-e.g., the
breadth-we might otherwise have been inclined to conclude.
A fortiori, that a practice is one with which the ratifiers were not
familiar-one they did not foresee and perhaps could not have foreseen-and therefore one they could not have believed violated a constitutional directive they were issuing is beside the point. The Court's
duty, according to originalism, is to invalidate a practice-whether or
not it was foreseen or even foreseeable by the ratifiers-if in the
Court's view the practice violates a constitutional directive issued by
the ratifiers. As Bork puts it:
66. See David A. J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations,65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373,
1380 (1990) (book review):
[Raoul] Berger's originalism is a kind of appeal to what I call Founders' denotations.
He holds that the meaning of a constitutional provision is to be understood in terms of
the things in the world to which the relevant Founders would have applied the term at
the time the constitutional provision was adopted authoritatively. A provision should be
interpreted to include certain things only if those things would have been included
within the meaning of the Clause by the Founders. According to Berger, then, the
Equal Protection Clause properly cannot be interpreted to invalidate state-sponsored
racial segregation because the relevant Founders (the Reconstruction Congress and ratifying state legislatures) would not have regarded such segregation as violative of equal
protection.
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[A]ll that a judge committed to [the philosophy of] original understanding requires is that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a major premise.
That major premise is a principle or . . . value that the ratifiers
wanted to protect against hostile legislation or executive action. The
judge must then see whether that principle or value is threatened by
the statute or action challenged in the case before him. The answer to
that question provides his minor premise, and the conclusion follows.
It does not follow without difficulty, and two judges equally devoted to
the original purpose may disagree about the reach or application of
the principle at stake and so arrive at different results, but that in no
way distinguishes the task from the difficulties of applying any other
legal writing.
This version of [originalism] certainly does not mean that judges
will invariably decide cases the way the men of the ratifying conventions would if they could be resurrected to sit as courts. Indeed, the
various ratifying conventions would surely have split within themselves and with one another in the application of the principles they
adopted to particular fact situations. That tells us nothing other than
that the ratifiers were like other legislators. Any modern congressional
majority would divide over particular applications of a statue its
members had just enacted. That does not destroy the value of seeking
the best understanding of the principle enacted in the case either of
67
the statute or of the Constitution.
67. BORK, supra note 41, at 162-63. See also Robert Bork, Original Intent and the Constitution, HUMAN. Feb. 1986, at 22, 26 ("The objection that we can never know what the [ratifiers]
would have done about specific modern situations is entirely beside the point. The originalist attempts to discern [and then enforce] the principles the [ratifiers] enacted, the values they sought
to protect."); Robert Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826-27 (1986) (arguing that his originalist theory does not require "judges ...
invariably to decide cases the way the [ratifiers] would if they were here today," but does require
them to "confine themselves to the principles the [ratifiers] put into the Constitution"). Cf. Dworkin, supra note 46, at 670 (commenting on the passage quoted in the text accompanying this
note): "We should pause to note what an amazing passage this is. It could have been written by
almost any of the people Bork takes to be members of the academic conspiracy against him and
the nation." For a vision of the Constitution substantially the same as Bork's, see Edwin Meese,
Speech Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division, Nov. 15, 1985,
Washington, D.C., reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 31, 33 (1986):
Our approach does not view the Constitution as some kind of super-municipal
code, designed to address merely the problems of a particular era-whether those of
1787, 1789, or 1868. There is no question that the Constitutional Convention grew out
of widespread dissatisfaction with the Articles of Confederation. But the delegates at
Philadelphia moved beyond the job of patching that document to write a Constitution.
Their intention was to write a document not just for their times but for posterity.
The language they employed clearly reflects this. For example, they addressed
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As the foregoing passage confirms, some originalists, like Bork, understand that the specification of a constitutional directive-that is, the
development of the concrete, contextual meaning of a constitutional directive-is not only not precluded by the originalist approach but is,
indeed, necessitated by it. For example, Bork writes:
When there is a known [constitutional] principle to be explicated the
evolution of doctrine is inevitable. Judges given stewardship of a constitutional provision ...whose core is known but whose outer reach
and contours are ill-defined, face the never-ending task of discerning
the meaning of the provision from one case to the next. There would
be little need for judges .. .if the boundaries of every constitutional
provision were self-evident ....It is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how the [ratifiers'] values . . . apply to the world we
know.... [Judges may] refine and evolve doctrine ... , so long as one
is faithful to the basic meaning of the [constitutional provision] ....
To say that such adjustments must be left to the legislature is ...
gradually to render constitutional guarantees meaningless.6 8
Near the end of his book Bork emphasizes that "[t]he provisions of the
Constitution state profound but simple and general ideas. The law laid
down in those provisions gradually gains body, substance, doctrines,
and distinctions as judges, equipped at first with only those ideas, are
forced to confront new situations and changing circumstances."6 9 Commenting on the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education7" outlawing racially segregated public schooling, Bork says: "[I]t
became evident over time that the racial separation the ratifiers of the
fourteenth amendment assumed"-the racial separation, i.e., that they
took for granted-"was completely inconsistent with the equal protection of the laws they mandated."7 1
It is not difficult to understand why Bork and some other originalists have moved toward what Gregory Bassham calls "moderate intencommerce, not simply shipping or barter. Later the Bill of Rights spoke, through the
Fourth Amendment, to "unreasonable searches and seizures," not merely the regulation
of specific law enforcement practices of 1789. Still later, the Framers of the 14th
Amendment were concerned not simply about the rights of black citizens to personal
security, but also about the equal protection of the law for all persons within the states.
The constitution is not a legislative code bound to the time in which it was written.
Meese added: "Neither, however, is [the Constitution] a mirror that simply reflects the thoughts
and ideas of those who stand before it." Id.
68. BORK, supra note 41, at 167-68.
69. BORK, supra note 41, at 352.
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. BORK, supra note 41, at 169.
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tionalism" originalism and away from what he calls "strict intentionalism" originalism: 7 2 The former
recognizes the importance of striking a balance between the values of
predictability and stability on the one hand, and those of flexibility
and adaptability on the other .... Moderate intentionalism enjoys the
significant advantage of being able to respond, as strict intentionalism
does not, both to originalism's traditional concern with the values of
certainty, stability, and judicial restraint, and to the perennial complaint of originalism's critics that the theory is hopelessly at odds with
73
the need to treat the Constitution as a living, flexible document.
Even more important, argues Bassham, is moderate intentionalism's
"capacity to recognize that constitutional provisions, in principle, may
signify aspirations and values that transcend the framers' temporally
bounded conceptions of the scope of those provisions. . . .Moderate
intentionalism thus seem[s] an attractive half-way house between two
unacceptable extremes: a jurisprudence that constitutionalized the repellent prejudices of former generations on the One hand, and
a juris74
prudence of open-ended judicial policymaking on the other.
In Appendix B to this lecture, I explain how an originalist judge
(of Bassham's "moderate intentionalist" variety), in specifying an indeterminate constitutional directive, should deal with (1) particular practices that they who issued the directive specifically meant the directive
to ban, (2) particular practices that they did not understand, or would
not have understood, the directive to ban, and (3) particular practices
that they specifically meant the directive not to ban. For now I want to
note that Bork's insistence that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment ("cruel and unusual punishments
72. Bork is admirably frank in acknowledging such movement. See BORK, supra note 41, at
352: "The concept of original understanding itself gains in solidity, in articulation and sophistication, as we investigate its meaning, implications, and requirements, and as we are forced to defend
its truths from the constitutional heresies with which we are continually tempted." Cf. Solum,
supra note 32, at 1601: "As originalism has been modified and defined in response to nonoriginalist critiques, the originalist's position has become more and more plausible as a theory of constitutional interpretation .... [Originalism] provide[s] an accurate description of the phenomenology
of constitutional practice."
73. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY 55-56 (1992).
74. Id. at 56. "In short, by adopting moderate intentionalism, conservatives could admit
that the framers had sometimes wrought more wisely than they had known, yet deny that they
had wrought half so wisely as nonoriginalists often claimed." Id. For a similar argument, see Eulis
Simien, Jr., It Is a Constitution We Are Expounding, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 67, 86-108
(1990).
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[shall not be] inflicted") simply cannot be interpreted to prohibit imposition of the death penalty because the ratifiers of the Constitution and
Bill of Rights presupposed the existence of the death penalty and, elsewhere in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, regulated imposition of
the death penalty,75 is difficult to square with Bork's paean to evolving
constitutional doctrine. The ratifiers' expectation that reliance on the
death penalty would persist into the future, and their decision, given
that expectation, to regulate imposition of the penalty, do not constitute
a decision to authorize reliance on the death penalty, to constitutionalize the death penalty-in that sense, they do not constitute a decision
to exempt the death penalty from possible prohibition by the Eighth
Amendment. Of course, that the ratifiers expected a practice, like the
death penalty or segregated public schooling, to persist into the future
is evidence that they did not believe that they were prohibiting the
practice. But that they did not believe that they were prohibiting the
practice does not mean that the constitutional directive they issued is
not best specified to prohibit the practice. Bork understands that he
cannot rule out, on the basis of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, the possibility that racially segregated public
schooling does indeed violate a directive represented by Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as Section 1 was originally understood-the
possibility, in that sense, that such schooling is really a violation of
Section 1-notwithstanding that the ratifiers of Section 1 did not so
think. It is therefore curious that Bork fails to see that, absent evidence
that the ratifiers meant to constitutionalize the death penalty-Bork
points to no such evidence, and I am aware of none-he cannot rule
out, on the basis of the originalist approach, the possibility that the
death penalty does indeed violate the directive represented by the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause as the Clause was originally understood-the possibility, that is, that the death penalty is truly a cruel or
unusual punishment-notwithstanding that the ratifiers of the clause
76
did not so believe.
75. See BORK, supra note 41, at 213-14. See also Scalia, supra note 44, at 863.
76. If a judge is what Michael Moore calls a "moral realist," one would expect the judge, if
an adherent of originalism to be an adherent of "a morally realist originalism." According to
Moore,
such .. .originalism would develop theories about the nature of equality, liberty, liberties of speech and of worship, cruel punishment, and the like, in a never completed
quest to discover the true nature of such things. To seek such theories is to conform to
the original understanding, just as to seek to apply the work "tiger" by the best theory
of what tigers are is to conform to the usual authorial intention in the use of that word.
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Many criticisms of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation have force if directed against (what Bassham calls) "strict
intentionalism"

originalism.7

If directed

against

the

originalism

presented here, however, as such criticisms sometimes are,7 8 they have
Moore, supra note 32, at 135.
Moore's defense of moral realism and his critique of moral conventionalism (see, e.g., Moore,
supra note 32, at 135) could be construed to confuse metaphysics, or ontology, with epistemology.
Knowing Michael Moore, however, I strongly doubt that he's even a little confused about the
distinction between metaphysics and epistemology. Perhaps the problem is that Moore is insufficiently careful to distinguish moral conventionalism from a coherentist conception of moral justification. As Moore no doubt understands, one can be a "realist"-a moral realist no less than a
scientific realist-with respect to metaphysics but a conventionalist, in the sense of a "coherentist"
or "holist," with respect to one's conception of justification-moral justification no less than scientific justification. See DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS
(1989). (Sotirios Barber did seem to fall prey to a confusion of metaphysics with epistemology in
his article Michael Perry and the Future of Constitutional Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1289
(1989)). In his recent, interesting book, Graham Walker is quite clear about the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology, but he seems ultimately to misconstrue the epistemology at
issue: coherentist epistemology. See GRAHAM WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 36 (1990). For example, Walker seems to confuse coherentist epistemology
with what he calls "nihilist/subjective epistemology." Id. at 57. Cf. HILARY PUTNAM, REASON,
TRUTH AND HISTORY xi (1981) ("the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the
world").
In any event, contrary to Barber's and Walker's criticisms of my work (see Barber, supra this
note, at 1289; WALKER, supra this note, at 16-17, 36-38, 124-25, 144 n.106), I am not a moral
conventionalist. I am a moral realist-as my new book, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991), makes amply clear. (Walker includes John
Courtney Murray among those "contemporary thinkers ... [who] have attempted 'moral realist'
approaches to constitutional theory .... WALKER, supra this note, at 17, 46. LOVE AND POWER
is partly a retrieval of Murray's work, especially his WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1944)). 1 am, however, an epistemological coherentist: My conception of justification is coherentist. See MICHAEL J.PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, ch.
4. In his book Walker understands Michael Moore-correctly, in my view-to be a moral realist
who is also an epistemological coherentist, and Walker criticizes, in part on the basis of the morally realist position, Moore's coherentist epistemology. Although the epistemological differences
between, on the one side-the coherentist side-Moore and me, and, on the other, Walker (and
Barber?) are real differences (See Edmund Santurri, Nihilism Revisited, 71 J. RELIGION 67
[1991]), 1doubt the differences have much cash value, if indeed they have any, insofar as constitutional adjudication is concerned.
77. Cf. William Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 337 (1985):
It should be a working precept of all jurisprudential criticism and polemics that before
launching an attack one should first identify worthy opponents and attribute to them
what one considers to be the least vulnerable interpretation of their views that the relevant texts will sustain, intellectual debate is impoverished when one attacks caricatures;
soft targets generally only suit weapons with correspondingly low firepower.
78. See Simien, supra note 74, at 93-94: "Much of the criticism [of originalism] . ..spills
over from a critique of strict originalism and a failure either to perceive or to admit the differ-
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much less force, if indeed they have any. Richard Kay has effectively
rebutted the principal practical and conceptual criticisms of originalism-criticisms to the effect that it is virtually impossible to discern the
origifial understanding of a constitutional provision or even to know
what "the original understanding" means, what it refers to. The reader
concerned with such criticisms could do no better, in my view, than to
consult Kay's work.7 9 It is remarkable that today some critics of
originalism trot out the frayed claims to which Kay has elaborately
responded without even citing his work, much less attending to it.8" It
is more remarkable that Bork failed to rely on or even mention Kay's
work, since Bork does not respond to the relevant criticisms, or even
identify them, nearly so well as Kay. Not that Kay minimizes the practical difficulties that attend the originalist approach to constitutional
adjudication; Kay is at least as sensitive to those difficulties as the critics whose arguments he so effectively parries. 8 1
The serious question concerns not the possibility but the legitimacy
of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation: The serious
question is not whether originalism can inform the practice of judicial
review-it can-but whether it should inform the practice.
IV
Originalism, then-or nonoriginalism? In the context of American
political-legal culture, which is the more defensible approach to constitutional interpretation?
ences between strict and moderate originalism."
79. See Kay, supra note 63, at 236-59. Note that my reference is to Kay's response to the
"It's Impossible" objection, not to his responses to the "It's Self-Contradictory" and "It's Wrong"
objections. See id. at 259-92. Kay's response to the "It's Wrong" objection seems to me basically
sound, but, for reasons I develop in the book from which this lecture is drawn, his response to the
"It's Self-Contradictory" objection-in particular, his reading of the original meaning both of the
Ninth Amendment and of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-seems to me problematic.
80. So far as I am aware, Ronald Dworkin, who seems to have a continuing interest in
challenging Borkean originalism, has never cited, much less discussed, Kay's important work. See
Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, NEW YORK REV., Aug. 13, 1987, at 3; Dworkin, supra
note 46. In the relevant chapter of his new book where he briefly recites, in the form of questions,
the claims to which Kay has responded, James Boyd White fails to notice Kay's work. See WHITE,
supra note 65, ch. 5.
81. Richard Kay is not alone. Gregory Bassham's recent book is excellent in rebutting
"three misconceived objections to originalism." See BASSHAM, supra note 73, 67-90. Other good
discussions include: Earl M. Maltz, Foreward: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV.
773; Earl M. Maltz, The Failureof Attacks on Originalist Theory, 4 CONST. COMM. 43 (1987);
Simien, supra note 74; Scalia, supra note 44.
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The argument for originalism begins with the observation that the
Constitution of the United States is the yield of an effort-actually, the
yield of many efforts over many years-to communicate, by means of a
written text, various directives. Those directives are mainly of two
types: (!) directives about what the institutions of the national government are to be and about how power is to be allocated, both horizontally, among the (legislative, executive, and judicial) institutions of the
national government, and vertically, between the national government
and the governments of the states; and (2) directives about how the
power of government-the power of the national government or of state
government or of both-is to be limited.8 2 The argument for originalism-the argument that the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation should inform the practice of judicial review-continues by
emphasizing the basic point of judicial review, which, as I explained in
Part One of this lecture, is to protect the various directives constitutionalized by our political ancestors: the various directives the constitutional text was originally understood to communicate-understood to
communicate by the People at the time the text was constitutionalized,
or by their representatives. Because it is not always clear what directive(s) a particular piece of the text, a particular constitutional provision, was originally understood to communicate, however, the Court
must "interpret" the provision: It must identify, or try to, the directive
the provision was understood, by the People at the time the provision
was constitutionalized, or by their representatives, to communicate.
"The Constitution," in each and all of its various parts, is an intentional political act of a certain sort: an act intended to establish, not
merely particular configurations of words, but particular directives,
namely, the directives the particular configurations of words were understood to communicate.83 The fundamental reason any part of the
Constitution-any provision of the constitutional text-was ratified is
that the ratifiers wanted to issue, and thought that in ratifying the provision they were issuing, a particular directive: the directive that they
82. Some constitutional provisions limit the power of the national government to protect the
power of state government, and some limit the power of state government to protect the power of
the national government. Some constitutional provisions limit the power of government-whether
the national government, state government, or both-to protect some aspect of the well-being or of
the autonomy of persons, whether persons as citizens or persons simply as human beings.
83. Cf. Richard S. Kay, The Bork Nomination and the Definition of "The Constitution,"
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1190, 1193 (1990): "The influence of the Constitution is the consequence of
continuing regard not for a particular assortment of words, but for the authority and sense of a
certain constituent act."
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understood, and that the public they represented understood, or would
have understood, the provision to communicate. (Does anyone really
believe that were we to amend the Constitution in our day, it might be
an intentional political act of a different sort: an act intended to establish, not particular directives, but merely particular configurations of
words? If not, why would anyone believe that when they established or
amended the Constitution in their day, they acted to establish merely
particular configurations of words?) It is difficult to discern any justification, therefore, for the Court privileging any understanding of a constitutional provision other than the original understanding-for
privileging, that is, any directive other than the directive the provision
was originally understood to communicate, the directive the provision
was ratified to establish.
Richard Kay has argued, in a series of essays, that nonoriginalism,
which would have the Court privilege some understanding other than
the original understanding, is divided against itself: "There may be
plausible theories of government and judicial review which demote the
authority of both intention and text, but it is hard to see what the political rationale would be for a theory that elevates a text for reasons
unrelated to the people and circumstances which created it." 84 Kay has
also asserted that:
[T]o the extent we would bind ourselves, in whole or in part, to rules
inferred from mere marks and letters on paper without reference to
the will of the human beings who selected those marks and letters, we
enter a regime very foreign to our ordinary assumptions about the
85
nature of law.
To deem authoritative the words of a constitutional provision "independently of the intentional act which created them," suggests Kay, "is to
disregard exactly that which makes the text demand our attention in
the first place. That the words will bear some different meaning is
purely happenstance. Without their political history, the words of the
Constitution have no more claim on us than those of any other text."18 6
Steven Smith has made much the same point: "[I]t is hard to think of
any recommendation for a regime of law created by the 'interpretation'
of disembodied words that have been methodically severed from the
84. Kay, supra note 63, at 234.
85. Richard S. Kay, Original Intentions, Standard Meanings, and the Legal Character of
the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMM. 39, 50 (1989).
86. Kay, supra note 83, at 1193.
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acts of mind that produced them.."87
It misses the point to observe of constitutional provisions what
Cass Sustein has observed of federal statutes: "The words were enacted; the original understanding was not. . . . Words have passed
through the constitutionally specified mechanisms for enactment of
laws; intentions have not, and they are therefore not binding." 88 Yes,
the words were enacted. But, as I pointed out earlier, in the absence of
a widely shared understanding of the meaning of words-especially, in
the presence of competing understandings (intertemporal, intratemporal, or both) of their meaning-there arises the question of
whose understanding of the words, the meaning of the words to whom,
is authoritative. I have presented an argument for answering that the
original understanding/meaning is authoritative. The ball is in the
court of those who do not like that answer to present an argument for
answering that some nonoriginal understanding/meaning is authoritative. Saying that "the words were enacted, the original understanding
was not" does not constitute such an argument, it does not tell us why
we should privilege some present meaning (for example) over the original meaning. 9 Sunstein's comment that "[iln the end, Congress enacts
laws, not its own views about what those laws mean" 9 is best understood not as a point against the originalism I have presented here.
Adapted to the context of constitutional (not statutory) adjudication,
the point, which the originalism I have presented here not only accepts
but insists on, is that "in the end, the ratifiers (on behalf of the People,
whom they represent) establish directives, not their own views about
what those directives mean in particular contexts."
In view of a recent critique of originalism by Samuel Freeman, it
bears emphasis that the connected arguments for judicial review and
for the originalist approach to judicial review, presented in this lecture,
87. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 119 (1989). (For an interesting response to aspects of Smith's essay, see Larry Alexander, Of Two Minds About Law and
Minds, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2444 (1990)). See also Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L. J. 1501, 1526-29 (1989).
Agreeing that the original meaning of the constitutional text is authoritative, Tom Merrill suggested to me in conversation that a different rule might apply if we had a practice of re-ratifying
the Constitution every generation.
88. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 129 (1990). 1 suspect it misses the point to make that observation of statutes (federal or
otherwise) as well.
89. Cf. id. ("courts might well conclude that what is controlling is the contemporary meaning of the statute").
90. Id.
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do not partake of ancestor worship of a Burkean or of any other variety.91 I have not said the constitutional directives our political ancestors
bequeathed us should be protected, in part by means of judicial review,
just because, or even partly because, our political ancestors bequeathed
them to us. (Who makes such a silly argument?) The point, rather, as I
explained earlier, is that "we, the People" now living-who, after all,
unlike our dead political ancestors, are now politically sovereign-should protect the constitutional directives they bequeathed us
for one of two reasons: First, some of the directives they bequeathed us
are good directives, directives that were we drafting a constitution from
scratch, we should want to include. Second, even if some of the directives they bequeathed us are not directives that were we drafting a constitution from scratch, we should want to include-indeed, even if some
of them are directives that we should want not to include-we should
nonetheless protect such a directive unless and until we can disestablish the directive in a way that is less problematic than the Court continuing to protect the directive. The mere fact that supermajorities of
those of our political ancestors who were enfranchised bequeathed us
certain constitutional directives is simply no part of the argument for
the originalist approach to judicial review. Therefore, Samuel Freeman's position to the contrary notwithstanding, "affirming the Constitution as sovereign citizens, and not as subjects of someone else's will,"
does not "require[] that we reject the doctrine of original meaning. "92
(Not that there may not be any other reasons for rejecting
originalism.)
It bears emphasis, too, that the argument presented here for the
originalist approach is not itself originalist. An originalist argument for
the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation-an argument,
for example, that the judicial review established by the Constitution as
originally understood is originalist review-would be question-begging:
The argument would presuppose the authority of the very thing at issue-the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. 93 Inci91. See Freeman, supra note 34, at 13.
92. See Freeman, supra note 34, at 17:
Public reason requires, at a minimum, that the Constitution's meaning be comprehensible and affirmable without appeals to external authority. The absence of others' authority (that of our ancestors, of God, or of anyone else) follows from democratic sovereignty. Therefore, affirming the Constitution as sovereign citizens, and not as subjects
of someone else's will, requires that we reject the doctrine of original meaning.
93. In at least one passage in his book Bork seems to come close to making the questionbegging originalist argument for originalism. See BORK, supra note 41, at 177. In the main, how-
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dentally, the argument that the founders' approach to legal interpretation was not originalist, in countering the question-begging originalist
argument for originalism, counters an argument that, because questionbegging, is already fatally flawed.
(Was the founders' approach to legal interpretation originalist?
Not in the "strict intentionalism" sense of originalism. 9' But there
seems to be little reason to doubt that to the extent "the framers collectively intended judges to employ any particular theory of constitutional
interpretation, there can be little doubt that this interpretive theory was
some variety of originalism. For during the founding era and indeed
for much of the succeeding century, originalism was not simply the
dominant theory of constitutional hermeneutics; with unimportant exceptions it was the only such theory."' 95 If the founders' approach was
not originalist even in the "moderate intentionalism" sense, the argument for originalism presented here would be undermined to this extent: We could not longer say, as I have, that the Constitution, in each
and all of its various parts, is an intentional political act of a certain
sort-an act intended to establish, not merely particular configurations
of words, but particular directives, namely, the directives the particular
configurations of words were understood to communicate. We would
have to say, instead, that in some of its parts-the parts ratified at the
founding-the Constitution is an act intended to canonize merely particular configurations of words.)
Of course, a judge purporting to follow the originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation can act in bad faith, 96 but so can a judge
purporting to follow any other approach to constitutional interpretaever, Bork seems to understand that any valid argument for originalism cannot be originalist.
BORK. supra note 41, at 150.
94. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985). (The strict intentionalism/moderate intentionalism language is Gregory
Bassham's. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.)
95. BASSHAM, supra note 73, at 68.
For important critical comments on H. Jefferson Powell's famous article, supra note 94, see
BASSHAM, supra note 73, at 67-71; Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 5
CONST. COMM. 77 (1988); Simien, supra note 74, at 99-102.
96. See Robert H. Bork, Foreword to G. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY V, xi (1985): "[Even a judge purporting to be [an originalist]
can manipulate the levels of generality at which he states the [ratifiers'] principles. . . . [Elven
under [originalism] there are no safeguards against that except the intellectual honesty of the
judge and the scrutiny of an informed profession that accepts the premises of [originalism]." See
also Suzanna Sherry, Original Sin, Nw. U. L. REV. 1215, 1222 (1990) ("originalism leaves . . .
much room for . . . manipulation").
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tion. The more significant point concerns the relation between the
originalist approach and the exercise of judicial "discretion." The argument presented here does not presuppose that the originalist approach
always or even often constrains judicial discretion to a significant extent. (Nor does it presuppose that a nonoriginalist approach fails to
constrain judicial discretion.)9 7 As Bork9" and many other enthusiasts
of originalism (e.g., former Attorney General Edwin Meese)" seem
not, or not always, to understand, originalism does not entail-it does
not necessarily eventuate in -judicial minimalism. I develop the point,
at length, elsewhere in the book from which this lecture is drawn.
V
The polemical character of academic constitutional discourse in
97. See Smith, supra note 87, at 111-12:
To be sure, the words of the enacted law may continue to constrain the judge. But the
essential fact that made those words (and not a science fiction novel, or even a law
review article) efficacious to bind the judge-i.e., the fact that the words express a
specific collective decision made by the designated political authority-is now de-emphasized or dismissed. The legal text is methodically disassociated from the phenomenon upon which its power to constrain depends. The important question that emerges
from this new perspective is not whether the statute, so viewed, could constrain judicial
choice. Perhaps it could. But the critical question is why a statute, so understood,
should constrain judges.
98. See BORK, supra note 41, at 150:
Even if evidence of what the founders thought about the judicial role were unavailable,
we would have to adopt the rule that judges must stick to the original meaning of the
Constitution's words. If that method of interpretation were not common in the law, if
James Madison and Justice Joseph Story had never endorsed it, if Chief Justice John
Marshall had rejected it, we would have to invent the approach of original understanding in order to save the constitutional design. No other method of constitutional adjudication can confine courts to a defined sphere of authority and thus prevent them from
assuming powers whose exercise alters, perhaps radically, the design of the American
republic. The philosophy of original understanding is thus a necessary inference from
the structure of government apparent on the face of the Constitution.
For a critical comment on Bork's argument that-and here I quote Richard Posner's construal of
Bork's argument-that "the judiciary should embrace originalism . . . [because] it is implicit in
our democratic form of government. Originalism is necessary in order to curb judicial discretion,
and curbs on judicial discretion are necessary in order to keep the handful of unelected federal
judges from seizing the reins of power from the people's representatives." See Richard A. Posner,
Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1369-70 (1990).
99. See Edwin Meese, 1ll, The Battle for the Constitution, 35 POL'Y REV. 32 (1985); Edwin Meese, Ill, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 2 BENCHMARK 1 (1986); Edwin
Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S.
TEX. L. REV. 455 (1986). (In his better moments, Meese contended for "moderate intentionalism"
originalism. See supra note 67.) See also William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
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the United States is evident in the tendency of some scholars to roll
their eyes, if not sneer, when someone defends the originalist approach
to constitutional interpretation. Sometimes the originalist approach is
derisively waived away with epithets like "authoritarian."' 0 It would
be more productive were critics of originalism to take the time and
spend the effort to present and defend an alternative, nonoriginalist
approach.
What might a nonoriginalist approach to constitutional interpretation, and the argument for it, look like? Suppose that (1) the Supreme
Court believes that a particular constitutional provision as originally
understood represents directive D, but (2) there is a very widespread
belief, perhaps even a consensus, among the present generation of the
People of the United States-at least, among those members of the
present generation who think about such matters-that D is, for some
reason or reasons, no longer acceptable. Might one then successfully
contend. for the legitimacy of the Supreme Court refusing to enforce
D? (If there is such a consensus, why not amend the provision?) Even
if so, the argument would not support the Court enforcing, in the name
of the provision, a directive not represented by the provision as originally understood; it would support merely the Court refusing to enforce
D. Moreover, about what existing constitutional provision (or provisions) can it plausibly be said that there is a widespread belief, in the
American political community (among those citizens who think about
such matters), that the directive arguably represented by the provision
as originally understood is no longer acceptable?
Suppose, instead, that (1) there is a widespread belief, perhaps
even a consensus, among the present generation of the People of the
United States (or among those citizens who think about such matters)
both that the meaning of a particular constitutional provision-the directive represented by the provision-is E and that E is not merely
acceptable but morally compelling, but (2) the Court believes, perhaps
correctly, that E is not the directive represented by the provision as
originally understood. Might one then successfully contend for the legitimacy of the Court enforcing E? Even if so, the supposition is
counterfactual: For any right- or liberty-regarding provision of the
Constitution the subject of a significant amount of litigation, there is
almost certainly a significant dissensus (among those citizens who think
about such matters) about the meaning of the provision-about, that
100.

See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1521-23 (1988).
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is, whether the provision represents this or, instead, that directive.1 0'
What is needed, therefore, is an argument that the Court may enforce
as constitutional a directive represented by a constitutional provision
neither (in the Court's view) as originally understood nor even (given
the dissensus) as understood by some significant segment of those
among the present generation of the People who think about such matters. That seems like a rather large, and largely unchecked, power to
concede to an electorally unaccountable judiciary.
Samuel Freeman has recently argued that the written Constitution
should be interpreted to represent, not the directives the provisions
were originally understood to represent, but
the principles we could reasonably intend in endorsing [the Constitution] as our public charter.... Against originalism's proposal that the
Constitution be interpreted by asking what values or principles our
ancestors intended, I have suggested an alternative inquiry: What
principles could we, as sovereign citizens, mutually acknowledge as
interpretive of the Constitution in the free and public use of democratic reason?1 °2
In responding to Freeman's proposal, I want to consider several
possibilities:
1. The principle "we could reasonably intend" in endorsing, as a
part of our public charter, a particularprovision is the principle the
provision was originally understood to establish. In that case, the
practical difference between the originalist approach and Freeman's is
nil.
2. There is more than one principle we could reasonably intend in
endorsing (as a part of our public charter) a particularprovision, only
one of which is the principle the provision was originally understood
to establish. But in that case, why should we want to concede to a
judicial elite-the nine members of the Supreme Court, or a majority
of them-the power to privilege, in the name of the provision, any principle other than the one the provision was originally understood to establish, which, ex hypothesi, is one of the principles, though not the
only one, we could reasonably intend in endorsing the provision? Why,
that is, should we want to make that concession unless we are inclined
to romanticize the Supreme Court (something that it is becoming in101. Consider, for example, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See supra
note 147 and accompanying text.
102. Freeman, supra note 34, at 17 & 20.
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creasingly difficult to do)?
3. The principle a particularprovision was originally understood
to establish is not one we could reasonably intend in endorsing the
provision. .. However we may evaluate it as a matter of political
theory, 11 3 Freeman's proposal is, at the end of the day, of little practical consequence except to the extent it is the case that the principles
the Constitution was originally understood to establish are not ones we
could reasonably intend in endorsing, as our public charter, the Constitution. What reason do we have for supposing that any, much less
many, of the principles the Constitution was originally understood to
establish are not ones we could reasonably intend in endorsing the Constitution? The challenge to Freeman is to identify those provisions
about which it is the case that the principles they were originally understood to establish are not ones we could reasonably intend in endorsing the provisions.1 4
3.1. The principle a particular provision was originally understood
to establish is not one we could reasonably intend in endorsing the provision, but the provision can be understood to represent a principle we
could reasonably intend in endorsing the provision. What existing constitutional provisions fit that description? Again, for any right- or liberty-regarding provision of the Constitution the subject of a significant
amount of litigation-e.g., the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment-there is almost certainly a significant dissensus, among
those citizens who think about such matters, about whether the provision represents this or that directive: Such a provision is almost certainly understood, by different citizens, to represent different directives.
Perhaps, therefore, such a provision can be understood to represent, not
103. Freeman's argument is pervaded by his Rawlsian/contractarian/neo-Kantian politicalphilosophical presuppositions. Those presuppositions are quite problematic, as 1, like increasing
numbers of others, have argued elsewhere. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE
OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, ch. 1 (1991). See also, e.g., WILLIAM A.
GALSTON. LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991);

Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1350 (1991); Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3 (1990).
104. What if a particular constitutional provision will bear only one reading, and thus read
the principle represented by the provision is not one that, as free and equal citizens, we could
reasonably constitutionalize? Freeman's position: "[W]hen the inherited Constitution contains
provisions deviating from equal sovereignty, the court is in no position to contravene it by declaring them invalid." Freeman, supra note 34, at 37.
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just one principle we could reasonably intend in endorsing the provision, but more than one such principle.
3.2. The principle a particular provision was originally understood
to establish is not one we could reasonably intend in endorsing the provision, but the provision can be understood to represent more than one
principle we could reasonably intend in endorsing the provision. Why
should we concede to the Court the power, not merely to decline to
enforce the principle the provision was originally understood to represent-which, ex hypothesi, we could not reasonably intend in endorsing the provision-but also to choose which of the two or more
principles we could reasonably intend, shall be privileged?
I doubt that in the context of American political-legal culture-a
culture in which there is a healthy skepticism about placing too great
an unchecked power in any political elite's hands-any argument for a
nonoriginalist approach to constitutional interpretation (at least, any
such argument I can imagine) would be credible. In what context, if
any, might an argument for a nonoriginalist approach be credible? Imagine a country, J, whose constitution was imposed on it by another
country that had recently defeated it in war. Imagine, too, that (1)
although after a time many citizens of J have come to embrace the
constitution, many others oppose it, and that (2) the party that has
been in power since the end of the war, and that has appointed all-the
judges to the country's constitutional court, came to power in part on
the basis of a platform of opposition to the constitution. Imagine, finally, that for various practical reasons, involving both domestic and
international politics, the party in power no longer seeks to repeal the
constitution but chooses, instead, to pay it lip service."0 5 One can see
how, in such a political-legal context, the originalist approach to the
interpretation of the constitution might have little appeal and a
nonoriginalist approach that marginalized the constitution-by ignoring the directives it was originally understood to represent and, instead,
imputing to it thin, inconsequential directives-might have considerable appeal. Notice, however, that the nonoriginalist approach contemplated in this scenario involves a judicial role that is relatively small/
105. Of course, this imaginary scenario is based, albeit loosely, on the constitutional experience of post-World War 1I Japan. See KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING (1991). Relatively few citizens of contemporary Japan seem to oppose the Constitution of Japan; most seem to embrace it. The Liberal Democratic Party (which, as it is sometimes said in Japan, "is neither liberal nor particularly democratic") is still understood by many citizens of Japan, however, to be "anti-constitutional."
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passive, vis-d-vis the other institutions of government, rather than
large/active. "Nonoriginalism ...is a two-way street that handles traffic both to and from individual rights." 10 6
So, while not impossible to imagine the outlines of a coherent argument for a nonoriginalist approach to constitutional interpretation,
the context in which that argument might be credible is worlds removed from the political-legal context of the United States. Pending
the elaboration of a persuasive case for a nonoriginalist approach to
constitutional interpretation-persuasive in the context of American
political-legal culture-we must conclude that the originalist approach
is the more defensible one and should, therefore, inform the practice of
judicial review.

Many people-judges and others-who find originalism an attractive approach to constitutional interpretation do so partly, if not principally, because they believe that the originalist approach, if properly understood and followed, entails-that it necessarily eventuates in-a
relatively small or passive judicial role in resolving constitutional conflicts, rather than in a relatively large or active role; they believe that
originalism entails a process of constitutional adjudication that is "legal" rather than "political." Relatedly, many critics of the modern Supreme Court's "activism," which they see as illegitimately political-most prominently, perhaps, Robert Bork1 07 -think
that
originalism gives them the needed constitutional-theoretical ground
from which to mount a fundamental assault on the legitimacy of much
of the modern Court's work product.
There is a sense in which the judicial role under originalism is
smaller or more passive than the judicial role under some imaginable
nonoriginalist positions. Under originalism the Court is to enforce as
constitutional only directives with a particular pedigree: directives represented by the constitutional text as originally understood. Under an
imaginable nonoriginalism, by contrast, the Court may enforce as constitutional directives represented by the constitutional text as it, the
Court, understands the text, even if the directives are not represented
by the text as originally understood. Nonetheless, the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation does not entail-it does not nec106.
107.

Scalia, supra note 44, at 856.
See BORK. supra note 41.
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essarily eventuate in-a small or passive judicial role; the originalist
approach is not necessarily inconsistent with a judicial role as large or
active as any apostle of "the Warren Court" (I count myself one) could
reasonably want.' 0 8
But that is a subject, and an argument, for another day.

108. Relatedly, it is a mistake to think that originalism is an adequate basis for challenging
the legitimacy of the "activist" decisions that have so exercised the modern Court's fiercest critics,
like Bork. As Lawrence Solum has observed, "[T]he originalists have won a Pyrrhic victory [over
nontextualists and nonoriginalists]. As originalism has been clarified in response to its critics, it
has gradually become more and more evident that it has no force as a critique of the kind of
interpretation practiced by the Warren Court." Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1599, 1602 (1989).
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Appendix A
DOES THE CONSTITUTION ESTABLISH JUDICIAL
REVIEW?
Does the Constitution of the United States-whether as ratified in
1789, as amended by ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, or as
subsequently amended, for. example, by ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1866-68-establish the practice of judicial review?
More specifically, does it establish judicial review: (1) by state courts,
of acts of state government; (2) by federal courts, in particular by the
Supreme Court, of acts of state government; (3) by state courts, of acts
of the federal government; or (4) by federal courts, in particular by the
Supreme Court, of acts of the federal government?
Judicial review of the first sort is mandated by the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the (1789) Constitution, which provides: "This
Constitution ...shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in
every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws
of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Judicial review of the
second sort-in particular, appellate review by the United States Supreme Court of state court decisions about the federal constitutionality
of state acts-"is not compelled by the language of the [1789] Constitution; it is implied from desirable ends ['uniform construction and application of the Constitution as against inconsistent state law throughout the country'] that are attributed to the entire [constitutional]
scheme. But most assuredly there is nothing in the language that forbids it. And Congress has so provided [for such appellant review]--consistently, from the first Judiciary Act of the first Congress
onward-and it has done so unambiguously."' 10 9 Moreover, at least by
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the Constitution, it was taken for granted-indeed, it was a basic presupposition of
the Fourteenth Amendment-that the Constitution establishes, in the
form of appellate review of state court decisions, judicial review by the
Supreme Court of state acts.
What about judicial review, of state acts, by federal courts other
than the Supreme Court? That practice, too, is well established-and it
does not seem problematic, given that federal court decisions about the
federal constitutionality of state acts are subject to appellate review by
the Supreme Court, which, in consequence of its power to review state
109.

BICKEL, supra note 4, at 13.
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court decisions about the federal constitutionality of state acts, already
has the power to review state acts.
The constitutional pedigree of judicial review of the third and
fourth sorts-judicial review of federal acts-is more controversial.
Some have argued that the Constitution, as ratified in 1789, establishes
such review, but others have disagreed.11 0 Even if by itself the constitutional text (as of 1789) is not clear, it is possible that, as some historians have argued, those who, during 1787-89, voted to ratify the Constitution understood and meant it to establish judicial review of federal
acts; other historians, however, have argued that the ratifiers did not so
understand the Constitution, or that the evidence that they did so understand it is weak. 11 Whatever the understanding of the ratifiers, Leonard Levy and others have argued that the practice of judicial review
of federal acts was for the founding generation of Americans a strong
and eventually inescapable inference from the nature and structure of
the national government established by the Constitution.1 2 Moreover,
by 1791, when the Bill of Rights became a part of the Constitution, it
was almost certainly taken for granted that the Constitution establishes
judicial review of federal acts. Indeed, such review is almost certainly a
basic presupposition of the Bill of Rights. Recall, in that regard, that
Hamilton's argument for such review, in The Federalist No. 78, was
published in 1788.113 Recall, too, that "[i]n introducing the Bill of
Rights . . . to the First Congress, Madison declared that 'independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the legislative or the executive.' "114
Even if we accept one or more of the arguments for the constitutionality of judicial review of federal acts, this problem remains: Recent scholarship suggests that the practice of judicial review of federal
acts that was (arguably) established by the Constitution at the end of
the eighteenth century was not as broad as the practice that was subse110.
(1982).
111.
112.

See

MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION. THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

13-14

See id. at 14-15.
See id. at 15-17. Cf. CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 3 (1969).
113. See Clinton L. Rossiter, Introduction, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at viii (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
114. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF'THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 66 (1980) (quoting I
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 457 (1834)).
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quently established by the Supreme Court, in the late nineteenth century, and that prevails today. 11 5 To credit that scholarship is to conclude that if the Constitution-whether as ratified in 1789 or as
amended by ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791-established a
practice of judicial review of federal acts, it did not establish the broad
modern practice, according to which "courts are entitled to overturn
any act of Congress [or of the President] they find to be unconstitutional, as long as a relevant case is brought before them. Moreover,
such a finding by the Supreme Court of the United States is final, not
subject to further action by any other agency of government, except in
conformity with the Court's decision." ' 6 According to the narrower
practice established by the Constitution at the end of the eighteenth
century, however, "federal courts are entitled to invalidate acts of Congress and the President with finality only when to let such acts stand
would violate the constitutional restrictions on judicial power." ' 1 7 However, does not Madison's statement to the First Congress, quoted in the
preceding paragraph, imply that the judicial review that is a basic presupposition of the Bill of Rights is a broader practice than that?
115. See CLINTON, supra note 3. For a recent, revisionist view of the emergence of the
modern practice of judicial review-a view that offers a different perspective from Clinton's-see
SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990).
116. CLINTON. supra note 3, at ix.
117. Id. at x. "A close reading of Marbury [v. Madison] itself supports no more than this
narrow view. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court lend additional support." Id.
When the framers undertook to place formal limitations on the legislative power,
they left little room for doubt as to what they had done. First, they provided for executive review of policy by instituting the veto power. Second, they provided for legislative
review through the override capacity. Third, they provided for limited judicial review in
cases of a judiciary nature.
This kind of coordinate review bears little resemblance to the famous Jeffersonian
idea which sometimes carries a similar label. His central point seems to be that all the
agencies of national government possess a similar capacity to pass judgment on constitutional questions, no matter what the question involved ...
[Under tihe "Marshallian" variant [of coordinate review] .
the decision as to
where power to make a final authoritative determination of constitutionality lies depends upon the type of case involved; and specifying the type of case in turn depends
upon functional relations which stem from the system of balanced government established in the Constitution.
Id. at 25-26. For an informative review of Clinton's argument, see Kent Newmyer, Marbury v.
Madison AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, 7 CONST. COMM. 380 (1990) (book review). See also Franck,
Origins and Limits of Judicial Review, 52 REV. POLITICS 485 (1990).
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The debate about whether the Constitution establishes judicial review has limited relevance today. The practice of judicial review, including the modern practice of judicial review of federal acts, has indisputably become a definitive feature of American government-indeed,
a feature we unreservedly hold out as a model to the world. Any argument that judicial review was not established by the Constitution and
is, in that sense, "unconstitutional," however plausible the argument
may be as an historical matter, is, at this point in the development of
American political institutions and practices, antiquarian. In the sense
that judicial review is now a definitive feature of American government-a constitutive feature-judicial review is constitutional.' 18
My concern in Part One of this lecture, in any event, has been not
with the legal question of the constitutionality of judicial review but
with the political-moral question of its legitimacy. In addressing that
question the state acts/federal acts distinction is not relevant. The force
of my argument for judicial review does not depend on whether the
judicial review is of state acts or, instead, of federal acts.
Appendix B
THE ORIGINALIST APPROACH: AN ADDENDUM
How should an originalist judge, in specifying an indeterminate
constitutional directive, deal with (1) particular practices that they who
issued the directive specifically meant the directive to ban, (2) particular practices that they did not understand, or would not have understood, the directive to ban, and (3) particular practices that they specif118. See BLACK. supra note 112, at 71:
[Jludicial review of Acts of Congress for federal constitutionality . . . rests also on the
visible, active, and long-continued acquiescence of Congress in the Court's performance
of this function. The Court now confronts not a neutral Congress nor a Congress bent
on using its own constitutional powers to evade the Court's mandates, as some state
legislatures have tried (and as Congress very clearly could succeed in doing, in many
cases, if it were so minded), but rather a Congress which has accepted, and which by
the passage of jurisdictional and other legislation has facilitated, this work of the Court.
See also Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation,and the Constitution,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 7 (1992) (judicial review "is primary among ... the many significant
practices, institutions, and procedures that are part of our constitution ... that are not set forth in
the document bearing the name 'the Constitution' "). Cf. SNOWlSS, supra note 115, at x: " do not
offer this [historical] reinterpretation as a way of attacking or defending the [modern] institution
of judicial review. I share the prevailing view that judicial authority over legislation has by now
generated sufficient support to be unaffected by assessments of original intent."
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ically meant the directive not to ban?
An originalist judge should not adopt a specification of an indeterminate constitutional directive if according the specification a particular practice (law, etc.) they who issued the directive specifically meant
to ban, and indeed thought that in ratifying the constitutional provision
at issue they were banning, does not violate the directive. Instead, she
should deem the directive determinate with respect to the question of
the constitutionality of such a practice and rule that the practice violates the directive. To do otherwise is almost certainly, if not necessarily, to misconceive the precise character of the directive they issued." 9
The better approach, for an originalist judge, is to presume that a specific aspect of the (complex) directive they issued is that the practice in
question is forbidden. 2 '
119. Cf. Terrance Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1046
(1981):
[Olur understanding of the framers' intentions is necessarily distorted if we focus solely
upon their larger purposes, ignoring the particular judgments they made in expressing
those purposes. Intentions do not exist in the abstract; they are forged in response to
particular circumstances and in the collision of multiple purposes which impose bounds
upon one another ....
[B]y wrenching the framers' "larger purposes" from the particular judgments that revealed them, we incur a loss of perspective, a perspective that
might better enable us to see that the particular judgments they made were not imperfect expressions of a larger purpose but a particular accommodation of competing
purposes.
120. One might want to argue, on that basis, that Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) was wrongly decided. (For a discussion of the case, see CHARLES
A. MILLER. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 39-51 (1969)). On the other hand,
one might respond to an argument of that sort by insisting that the relevant description of the
practice they who issued the relevant directive specifically meant to disallow is not P but P at time
T, or P in context C, whereas the practice the court is being asked to invalidate in the name of the
directive is P at time U, or P in context D. However, such a response may seriously underestimate
the intertemporal continuities in the historically extended American political community. Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3172 (1990) (Scalia, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting):
According to the Court, "we cannot say that [face-to-face] confrontation [with
witnesses appearing at trial] is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the right to confront one's accusers." . . . That is rather like saying "we
cannot say that being tried before a jury is an indispensable element of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the right to jury trial." The Court makes the impossible
plausible by recharacterizing the Confrontation Clause, so that confrontation
(redesignated "face-to-face confrontation") becomes only one of many "elements of
confrontation." . . . The reasoning is as follows: The Confrontation Clause guarantees
not only what it explicitly provides for-"face-to-face" confrontation-but also implied
and collateral rights such as cross-examination, oath, and observation of demeanor
(TRUE); the purpose of this entire cluster of rights is to ensure the reliability of evi- dence (TRUE); the Maryland procedures preserves the implied and collateral rights
(TRUE), which adequately ensure the reliability of evidence (perhaps TRUE); there-
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Should an originalist judge ever adopt a specification of an indeterminate constitutional directive if according to the specification a particular practice they who issued the directive did not think they were
banning-or, in the case of a practice they did not foresee and perhaps
could not have foreseen, would not have thought they were banning if
they had foreseen the practice-violates the directive? Or, instead,
should she deem the directive determinate with respect to the question
of the constitutionality of such a practice and rule that the practice
does not violate the directive? It is possible, of course, that to conclude
that a directive, properly specified, does not tolerate a practice they
who issued the directive did not think, or would not have thought, they
were banning may be to misconceive the character of the directive they
issued.1 21 But it is also true that to insist that "the directive they issued" must be understood so as to tolerate any practice they who issued
the directive did not think, or would not have thought, they were banning may be to misconceive the character of the directive they issued.
"A principle does not exist wholly independently of its author's subjective, or his society's conventional exemplary applications, and is always
limited to some extent by the applications they found conceivable;"
nonetheless, "[w]ithin these fairly broad limits, . . . [they who constitutionalized the principle] may have intended their examples to constrain
more or less." 12' 2 Relatedly, to say that whatever "the directive they
issued" is, it necessarily tolerates any practice they who issued it did
fore the Confrontation Clause is not violated by denying what it explicitly provides
for-"face-to-face" confrontation (unquestionably FALSE). This reasoning abstracts
from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right. It is wrong because the
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial
procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was
"face-to-face" confrontation. Whatever else it may mean in addition, the defendant's
constitutional right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" means, always
and everywhere, at least what it explicitly says: the " 'right to meet face to face all
those who appear and give evidence at trial.'
121. Cf. LAWRENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1164-65 (2d. ed. 1988)
(discussing the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment):
Where the original intent not to outlaw a practice is clear, a judge ought to view the
history as evidence that the practice does not violate the Constitution. The showing
should not, however, settle the question entirely-particularly if the context has
changed.... To prevail, the opponent ought to demonstrate that, history notwithstanding, the practice offends the fundamental concepts . . . that underlie the constitutional
language.
122. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B. U.L. REV.
204, 217 (1980). Brest adds: "To the [originalist] interpreter falls the unenviable task of ascertaining, for each provision, how much more or less." Id.
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not think, or would not have thought, they were banning is at odds with
the originalist approach defended in Part Two of this lecture, which
"recognize[s] that constitutional provisions, in principle, may signify
aspirations and values that transcend the framers' temporally-bounded
conceptions of the scope of those provisions .... Moderate intentionalism thus seem[s] an attractive half-way house between two unacceptable extremes: a jurisprudence that constitutionalized the repellent
prejudices of former generations on the one hand, and a jurisprudence
of open-ended judicial policymaking ...on the other." '2 3
But what if they who issued a directive not only did not think, or
would not have thought, that in issuing the directive they were banning
a particular practice, but specifically meant not to ban it; what if they
specifically meant to allow the practice? If their specific intention to
disallow a particular practice should be deemed determinative, why not
also their specific intention to allow a practice? Even if their specific
intention to allow a particular practice should be deemed determinative, about what provisions of the United States Constitution, provisions
regarding a right or a liberty, is it the case that they who voted to
ratify the provision specifically meant, not only to disallow a particular
practice (or practices), but also to allow a particular practice? Is it
true, for example-do the relevant historical materials support the
claim-that they who voted to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment specifically meant, not only to disallow discrimination based on race, but
also to allow discrimination based on sex? That they did not think they
were banning discrimination based on sex is beside the point: The question is whether they specifically meant to allow it. Who among those
who voted to ratify-the Fourteenth Amendment, and how many, specifically meant to allow such discrimination? It seems that it would be
quite difficult, with respect to constitutional provisions regarding rights
or liberties, to support an historical claim, not merely of a specific intention to disallow, but of a specific intention to allow alongside a specific intention to disallow. Indeed, it seems quite doubtful that such
claims could often (ever?) be sustained.

123.

See supra note 72.

